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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After 10 years of post-communist transformation, countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEECs) have seen very divergent outcomes to what can be considered as broadly 
similar transition policies1. While central European economies have embarked on a path of 
sustained recovery, others are still struggling with the ‘transformational recession’. Economic 
divergence and increasing disparities in per capita incomes among CEE countries prevails 
whether measured over the whole period 1989-2000 or just for the period after 1993 (see 
UN ECE, 2000, chart 5..4.4, p. 186)1. Differences between different countries in growth 
rates and industry restructuring have increased to such an extent that they are reflected in 
their ability to generate the capabilities and institutions needed to import, use, and diffuse 
technologies and to improve upon them. While differences in growth rates may be attributed 
to a significant extent to differences in speed and scope of transition policies, the most 
important factors behind these differences are structural. Differences in the socialist legacy, 
inherited levels of development, extent of integration into global production networks, 
proximity to the EU, and differences in the role of the state are some of the most important 
structural factors that underlie divergent patterns of growth in CEE. Differences in 
transition policies do matter but i) not to the extent that their proponents believe, ii) their 
effects cannot be understood without taking into account differences in initial conditions 
and structural factors that we mentioned. 
 
In this report, we analyze factors that underlie differences in technology and industry 
upgrading between different CEE economies as well as between different industrial sectors 
in these economies. Our point of departure, which, hopefully, should be clear by the end of 
the paper, is that the central issue in the transformation of national industrial systems in 
CEE is the reconstruction of enterprises and the way these economies have inserted 
themselves into world economy. It is important to bear in mind that these two factors are 
also the major causes of the dynamic inefficiency of socialist economies. During the 
socialism, enterprises were reduced to production units while innovation process was 
governed through government and party hierarchies. Closed character of these economies, 
though of varying degrees in different countries, only reinforced their technological 
stagnation. Differences in the degrees to which enterprises were constituted as business units 
and the degree to which economies were open have, in our view, overwhelming influence on 
the way different CEE countries have modernized their industrial systems during the 1990s. 
In addition, differences in interaction between national industrial systems and international 
value chains that took place during the 1990s across different CEE countries can explain to 
great extent differences in depth and breadth of industry restructuring. These differences are 
leading to very diverse outcomes in terms of growth, type of market economy that is 
emerging in different countries as well as in terms of innovation and technological capability.  
 
A first part of the paper looks at the relationship between innovation and technology 
upgrading of East European economies and growth. Second part describes the 
transformation processes across several dimensions of national industrial systems in Eastern 
Europe (enterprises, R&D and innovation activities, international value chains and industry 
sectors). Third part analyzes the role of the state in transformation of national industrial 
                                                 
1 However, within individual central and east European sub-regions convergence rather than divergence has 
been the prevailing trend, especially in the period 1993-2000 (ibid.). 
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systems and evaluates policy activities. Fourth part draws conclusions and summarizes key 
findings. 
  
 
2. GROWTH, INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 
 
The relationship between technology and growth is highly nationally specific and is 
inseparable from country specific institutional context. In this respect, the CEE 
‘transformational recession’, which in some countries is followed by recovery, shows two 
specific features.  
First, differences in factor endowments in labor, capital and knowledge, or other 
variables, which are usually used in growth accounting exercises, cannot explain differences 
in the economic growth during the 1990s between CEE countries. Factor expansion is not 
significantly linked to growth in transition period. The potential for growth is quite large 
based on removing distortions and introducing organizational innovations2. This may be 
expected given the scale of reallocations and restructuring that had to take place in these 
economies during the 1990s. In this period, reallocations and restructuring have been much 
more important for growth than factor accumulation. On the other hand, there is not 
consensus on factors that can explain recovery and growth. Economists consider initial 
conditions, macroeconomic policies, and structural reforms in transition period as the major 
determinants of recovery. Indeed, each of these factors individually positively influences 
growth but the major problem is how they are mutually related. For example, policy choices 
are influenced by different initial conditions and, hence, cannot be considered as 
independent factors. Many institutional factors are omitted due to data problems. It is 
certain that in a long-term, growth in CEE will increasingly depend on the expansion in 
physical and human capital. 
Second, industrial upgrading is a function of general factors like education, science, 
general purpose physical investments like telecomm, diversified knowledge base, as well as 
of specific factors, like firm-specific skills, know-how; training, sector specific equipment. 
CEE growth during the 1990s shows that general factors of production, like educated labor 
force, are not sufficient for growth. The gap between potential in terms of educated 
population and outcomes is in some countries, particularly in Russia, remarkable. The 
sources of growth in CEE have not been so far directly linked to R&D but to the acquisition 
of knowledge in the production process and through different forms of firm-based learning 
(Dyker and Radosevic, 2000). This led to marginalisation of  public R&D systems through 
budget cuts and the lack of demand for R&D. There have been visible improvements in 
export competitiveness in several central European economies, which have been mainly 
driven by foreign direct investments (Hunya, 2000).  
In this section we analyze the relationship between growth, technology and 
competitiveness in Eastern Europe. First, we analyze growth of industry, manufacturing 
productivity and their relationship to competitiveness. Second, we review the evidence on 
patterns of structural change in industry and highlight their effects on industrial and 
technological upgrading of CEE economies. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See McKinsey (1999) study for evidence on this in the case of Russia. 
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2.1. INDUSTRY, LABOR PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITIVENESS 
 
The average level of industry production in 1999 was in CEE 62.1% of its 1989 level. 
After 10 years of post-socialist transformation the real gross industry output surpassed 1989 
level only in Poland and Hungary (table 1). In three central European countries (Czech R, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) and Belarus industry output reached above three-quarters of the 1989 
level. In all other CEE countries industry outputs are around half of the previous levels, 
except in Latvia, Moldova and Yugoslavia where industry is producing only 35% of their 
socialist output3. 
 
Table 1: Real gross industry output in 1999, 1989 = 100  
Poland  122.3 
Hungary  114 
Belarus  95.6 
Czech Republic  76.9 
Slovakia  76.4 
Slovenia  75.6 
Estonia  56.7 
Croatia  56 
Ukraine  51 
Russian Federation  49.7 
FYR of Macedonia 45.8 
Latvia  45.3 
Bulgaria  43.1 
Romania  42.7 
Lithuania  35.3 
Yugoslavia  35.2 
Republic of Moldova  33.7 
Source: UN ECE, Economic Survey of Europe, 2000, No.2/3. 
 
This decline of industry is partly result of the inherited ‘oversized’ industry sector, 
which served the needs of mostly closed socialist economies. Hence, industry decline should 
be seen in the context of a broad structural change that has taken place during the 1990s in 
CEE.  Deindustrialization, tertiarization and deagraarization in some (mainly in central 
Europe), and re-agrariazation in other CEE countries (Bulgaria, Romania, CIS countries) are 
those processes within which the downsizing of industry took place4. However, the extent of 
downsizing of industry in CEE cannot be explained only by inevitable structural changes. 
That alone cannot explain huge differences in industrial decline among individual countries. 
We think that these differences are also the result of different national patterns of 
transformation of their industrial systems. 
 
 Despite sharp de-industrialization, CEE countries are likely to continue to be 
economies with the high shares of industry. Industrial employment as a share of the total 
employment had stabilised by the mid-1990s at a level above that in comparable market 
                                                 
3 We have excluded war thorn Bosnia and Herzegovina whose 1999 level of industry reached only 9% of its 
1989 output. 
4 For an extensive account on these processes see Landesmann (2000) and EBRD (1999). 
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economies (EBRD, 1999, p. 89, chart 4.2.). Given their current levels of GDP per capita 
CEE countries are still ‘overindustrialized’ (see EBRD, 1999, and Landesmann, 2000). 
However, the current shares of industry are mainly due to low levels of GDP per capita 
rather than the result of ‘overindustrialization’. In fact, the problem can be interpreted as the 
problem of low GDP per capita given the scale of industry capacities in Eastern Europe. 
This raises the problem of competitiveness of CEE industry, as essential for their long-term 
growth. In support of this, we observe in many CEE economies the limits of tertiarization 
unless further improvements in industry take place.  
 
Once growth in CEE economies resumed, it has been accompanied by rising labour 
productivity in industry (see Table 2). In the early stages of transition, developments in 
productivity throughout the region were dominated by the decline in output, as many firms 
initially avoided large-scale layoffs even though demand for their products has collapsed. 
Firms often hoarded labour and financed current production through inter-industry credit. 
This decline in measured productivity began to be reversed in most countries after 2-3 years, 
primarily as a result of labour shedding. However, strong fluctuations in rates of labour 
productivity growth in most of CEE countries suggests that improvements are being driven 
more by uneven paths of layoffs, closure of unproductive lines of businesses and reactive 
restructuring than by continuous technological improvements.  
 
Table 2: Labour productivity in manufacturing, annual changes 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria  -11.3 -4.2 -0.9 5.4 14.6 -3.3 -10.1 -4.3 12.3 -2.8 
Czech R.   0.6 -19.3 -0.2 -0.5 7.9 11.1 9.6 11.1 5.6 2.2 
Hungary  -4 -8.3 4 16.3 14.7 9.8 3.3 13 10.1 0.2 
Poland  -19.7 0 12.5 13.8 13 7 10 12.1 4.7 9.5 
Romania  -19.2 -17.9 -13.5 1.4 13.3 24 14.8 -1.4 -15.9 9.8 
Slovakia  -1.4 -10.6 1.6 -3 7.3 5.3 2.5 4.1 11.5 2 
Slovenia  -7.9 -2 -3 6.7 11.4 8.3 6.7 4.5 5.4 1.8 
Estonia   -3.2 -30.3 -5.1 0.9 3.8 7.8 2.6 11.4 -10.6 
Bulgaria and Slovakia, figures are for industry.  
Source: EBRD, Transition Reports , 1995, 2000 and 1999 
 
Moreover, like East Germany, all CEE economies have recently recorded a 
slowdown in rates of growth of labor productivity. For example, the average growth rate of 
labor productivity between 1993-95 of 7.7% slowed down to 5.5% in 1996-98 and to 1.5% 
in 1999. This might suggest that the initial sources of growth and productivity may be soon 
exhausted and that the issue of technical change as the major source of long-term and 
sustainable growth needs to be addressed. 
In the initial years of the post-socialist transformation, differences among countries 
in employment policies have played a major role in explaining trends in manufacturing 
productivity. However, after 10 years trends in employment started to broadly follow trends 
in industry output across CEE (see figure 1). If it was not for the three countries with the 
biggest drop in output (Yugoslavia, Moldova and Lithuania) but which pursued very 
different employment policies this relationship would have been much stronger5.  
 
                                                 
5 In regression without these three economies coefficient of determination rises to 0.72. 
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Source: UNECE, 2000 
 
An increase in labour shedding is not reflected in relative wage rates, which vary much less 
than could be expected given differences in productivity across CEE. For example, wage 
shares in manufacturing output ranged from 0.25 in Czeh Republic to 0.52 in Estonia (table 
3). Landesmann (2000, p. 102) shows that this is also the case when wages are measured in 
absolute values. A much smaller dispersion of wages manifests itself in big differences in 
productivity, and then in even bigger differences in unit labor costs.   
 
Table 3: Changes in productivity, unit labor costs and wage shares in manufacturing 
 Productivity Change, 
1995-99 
Unit Labour Costs, 
1995-99 
Wage share in 
output, 1999 
Latvia  66.1 129 0.48 
Poland  51.2 12.3 0.34 
Russian Federation  50.4 -49.4  
Czech Republic  45.9 20 0.25 
Croatia  42.1 24.7 0.51 
Hungary  41.4 -15.4 0.29 
Lithuania  34.5 125 0.33 
Romania  29.6 0 0.28 
Slovenia  29.6 12.4 0.35 
Slovakia  27.7 18.8 0.29 
Estonia  14.1 102 0.52 
Bulgaria  -9.2  0.41 
Coefficient of Variation* 52.9 161 25.1 
* Coefficient of variation is calculated as standard deviation divided by the average. 
Source: EBRD, 2000 
 Increasing differences in unit labour costs shows increasing differences in 
competitiveness among CEE economies. A high rise in productivity in the 1995-99 period in 
Hungary and, surprisingly, in Russia led to actual decrease in unit labour costs or significantly 
improved competitiveness. A high increase in productivity in Latvia has not been 
transformed into competitive advantages due to exceptionally high rise in wages. Table 3 
shows a range of changing competitive positions of the CEE economies, which are driven 
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more by differences in productivity rather than differences in wages. Table 4 by Landesmann 
(2000) shows in the case of central Europe, Bulgaria and Romania that the growth of wages 
is more uniform across different sectors than the growth in productivity. In this respect, the 
situation in the CEECs only confirms a stylized fact from growth theory which suggest that 
the wages tend to be relatively ‘rigid’, in the sense that they appear to adjust very slowly, if at 
all, to unbalances in the labour market. (Dosi et al, 1994, Jones, 1998). 
 
Table 4 
Average initial gaps and growth rates for  
industry groups, 1991-1997  
(Per cent) 
 Low-tech Resource-intensive High-tech 
 
Productiv
ity Wages 
Productiv
ity Wages 
Producti
vity Wages 
Gap ............ 38.2 33.7 44.6 29.2 34.3 27.4 
Growth 
rate ............. 3.5 4.9 7.0 7.8 16.1 7.9 
Source:  Calculated from the WIIW Industrial Database.  
Note:  The gap is defined as the level of a variable (productivity, wage rate) in the CEECs in 1991 x 100 
divided by the level of that variable in Austria in 1991. Growth rates refer to the annual percentage rate of 
decline in the gap between 1991 and 1997. 
Source: Landesmann, 2000, p. 106 
 
 In addition, these data suggest that catching-up is stronger and in some cases much 
stronger in the ‘medium/high-tech’ (machinery, electrical equipment, transport) industries 
than in the ‘low-tech sectors. Landesmann (2000) also shows that the unit labour costs in 
most countries are rising much faster in the low tech than in the medium/high-tech 
industries.  
 This trend is partially compatible to trends in foreign trade, which also shows 
remarkable visible improvements in export unit prices and in technology structure of export. 
However, this improvement is far from uniform across countries. Trade data for all CEE 
economies show an increasing differentiation in export competitiveness. A review of trade 
analyses undertaken by Guerrieri (1999), Landesmann (1997)(2000), Kubielas (1999) and 
Radosevic and Hotopp (1999) suggest few broadly similar conclusions: 
 
i) Until mid-1990s all CEE countries exhibited weaknesses in the production and export of 
R&D-intensive and capital goods. Their relative strengths were in products based on the 
traditional comparative advantages of cheap labour and abundant natural resources. When 
engineering exports to CMEA had to be abruptly abandoned, adjustment in the CEE 
countries took the form of simplification of technological structure of trade or shift towards low-
technology-content products. A return to ‘primary comparative advantage’ in low-cost labour was a 
feature of all the CEE countries in the early years of trade liberalisation.  
 
ii) Within this general pattern, we have seen increasing differentiation among eastern 
European countries in their overall trading performance, and in the degree to which they are 
improving their performance in scale- and R&D-intensive sectors, and in capital goods. The 
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countries of the former USSR, including Russia, have seen their share of trade remain 
constant, with an overwhelming and increasing reliance on natural resources and the primary 
processing thereof. Romania and Bulgaria have experienced an overall decline in their trade 
shares, with increasing reliance on traditional sectors like textiles and clothing and on 
commodities like steel and metals. By contrast, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
have increased their overall trade share, and - while continuing to be relatively competitive in 
traditional sectors - have increased their shares in R&D- intensive sectors or capital goods. 
In other words, trade statistics suggest that the three Central European countries are 
upgrading their technology more successfully than the other formerly centrally planned 
economies. 
 
 
iii) The highly disaggregated data suggest the existence of three patterns of catching up, and 
accompanied learning processes at micro level. These are: 
 
· strengthening of export patterns based on labour intensive industries like clothing 
and footwear in the majority of the Eastern European economies; 
· the emergence of technology intensive export in transport machinery and the 
emergence of export of electronic and electric products especially in Hungary and 
Czech R; 
· the maintenance of the previous strong orientation of export in commodities which 
still remains an important part of the export product spectrum but only in Bulgaria 
represents the most substantial share of export. 
 
The technology intensive export has the highest share in Hungary followed by the Czech R, 
while its share in Romania and Bulgaria is the lowest. Poland represent an intermediate case.  
 
This multiplicity of learning patterns suggests that the modes of involvement of the CEE 
into the global economy do not proceed in a linear manner, i.e. along one mode of 
adjustment but represent a combination of several patterns. This finding is confirmed by 
unsystematic but persuasive FDI evidence where we find a broad variety of factory types 
(see Radosevic, 1997). How can these patterns be explained? 
 
Our opinion is that they are the result of the two groups of factors. On the one hand this 
process is shaped by inherited domestic structural features which are in inherited 
specialisation and in concentration/dispersion of the trade product structure. These supply 
side factors are coupled with features of EU demand, which is manifested through different 
forms of subcontracting (clothing) or FDI (cars and car parts), or market demand 
(commodities). This suggests that the emerging trade patterns, especially in central and 
eastern Europe, cannot be explained without taking into account their micro-basis and 
strategies of foreign companies which are strongly shaping FDI and subcontracting patterns. 
 
There seems to be a significant difference between the ‘capacities’ of the CEECs in terms of 
measured R&D and human capital, and outcomes in terms of technology structure and unit 
prices of exports after 1989. The gap between export structure and domestic human capital structure is 
most striking in the case of Russia. Although this gap seems to be narrowing, with 
improvements in export unit prices, it is not clear whether in some countries, particularly the 
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eastern European (Bulgaria, Romania) and the European CIS countries it can be closed in 
the medium-term. In the trade of the former CMEA, engineering sectors had a strong 
presence. However, with the shift in trade from ‘East’ to ‘West’ the full extent of the 
uncompetitiveness of these sectors, inter alia in technological terms, has been revealed. This 
shift has been further reinforced by the sharp decline in demand in the CEE countries. It is 
only that in central European countries, mainly driven by FDI, we observe reversal in trends 
and visible expansion of engineering exports, and even the emergence of quite new 
exporting sectors like office machinery in the case of Hungary.  
 
The increasing differentiation that is emerging among CEE economies in terms of growth 
suggests that trade tends to reinforce differences. Against a background of burgeoning FDI-
based trade, subcontracting and different forms of production alliance, we may expect 
generation of ‘virtuous’ circles of interaction between domestic and foreign enterprises in 
some countries - but also vicious circles, in the form of low- technology-level specialization 
without much linkage or spillovers in others.  
 
 
2.2. INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING 
 
In order to understand the type of structural and technological adjustments faced by eastern 
European countries, some understanding of initial levels in these respects is needed. The 
following main features were found to be present in the industrial structure of the central 
and eastern European economies (CEECs) in 1989 (Urban (1999)6:  
 
· A general excess of heavy industry, especially of the metallurgical industry and coke & 
refineries in the CEECs compared to EU-North as well as EU-South; 
· A general structural deficit in the CEEC paper, printing and publishing industries, due to 
less advertising and packaging and perhaps, to some degree, to the limited freedom of 
the press in socialist countries; 
· A relative excess in CEECs in food production and light industries such as textiles & 
clothing and leather & leather products, etc. compared to EU-North, but a deficit in 
these industries compared to EU-South; and 
· On the other hand, a pronounced structural deficit of CEECs in sophisticated 
engineering industries, like electrical and mechanical engineering and transport-
equipment, compared to EU-North, but a surplus in these industries compared to EU-
South.  
 
In general, Urban’s (1999) analysis shows that ”structural deficits” exist in sophisticated 
branches of engineering like mechanical and electrical engineering and transport equipment, 
compared to EU-North but ”structural surpluses” in these branches versus EU-South. For 
the labour-intensive industries, the reverse seems true: structural surpluses versus EU-North 
but deficits versus EU-South exist. This suggests that in terms of industry structure 
                                                 
6 Urban (1999) used the share of each single industry in total manufacturing output of a CEEC to the share of 
the same industry in EU-North and EU-South. The resulting positive or negative deviations were interpreted as 
”structural surpluses” or ”structural deficits” of the CEEC as compared to the group of Western countries 
under consideration. 
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economies of the central and Eastern Europe occupy intermediate position within the wider 
European economy. Here we do not analyze structural change in Russian economy primarily 
due to data compatibility problems. However, analysis of structural changes in Russia on its 
own show that there is not clear evidence of any structural change in the Russian economy 
at the level of output of main sectors. Within the industry the share of engineering sectors 
significantly shrank indicating a kind of structural regression (Dyker, 2000).  
After 1989, changes of industrial profiles in central and eastern Europe took place in 
two phases, quite distinct from each other. Measured by the structural deviation indicator, 
CEECs’ industrial profiles diverged from EU-North in the beginning of transition and started 
to converge later; towards EU-South, a tendency of convergence first and divergence later, 
could be observed (see Lndesmann, 2000, p. 108). However, when compared to each other, 
the process of industrial change became more differentiated in the individual CEECs as well. 
Table 5 shows manufacturing branches with changes above +/- one percentage point in 
terms of relative employment.  
 
Table 5: Manufacturing branches with the biggest changes in relative employment, 1993-
1998, (in percentage points) 
 
Table 5: Manufacturing branches with the biggest changes in relative employment, 1993-1998  
(Percentage) 
Industry Bulgaria Slovenia Slovakia Romania Poland Hungary Czech Republic 
Machinery & equipment n.e.c 6.2  -3.4 -4.2 -2.0  -2.7 
Food 5.9 1.6  1.4  -2.6 2.7 
Textiles 5.8 -2.3  1.3 -1.1 1.0 -1.1 
Pulp & paper 1.5     1.2  
Electrical & optical equipment -2.2  1.7   4.9 1.5 
Transport equipment -3.5 -1.7    1.6  
Metals -5.3 -1.0 3.4   -1.7  
Manufacturing n.e.c. -10.6 1.0   1.6   
Rubber and plastics  1.1   1.0 1.2 1.5 
Leather   -1.5     
Chemicals   -1.3     
Wood   1.8 1.1   1.2 
Coke & Petroleum       -1.2 
        
 
In all countries, except Romania, we observe a multiplicity of adjustment patterns. 
By this we mean that these economies simultaneously ‘gain’ or ‘lose’ relative employment in 
both traditional and capital or technology intensive sectors. Only on Romania, we observe 
relative increase in traditional industries (food, textiles and wood products) on the account 
of machinery and equipment. Given that the starting position of the central and eastern 
European economies was earlier described as intermediate within the wider Europe this may 
not be surprising. Industrial adjustment takes place in parallel in both traditional and in 
technology and capital intensive industries. Disaggregated export data also show this 
multiplicity of adjustment patterns. For example, Landesmann (1996, 1997, 1999) shows that 
in terms of trade structure the more advanced of the CEE economies occupy a middle 
position between the industrially more advanced ‘Northern’ EU and ex-EFTA countries on 
the one hand, and the South European economies, on the other. To a certain extent, this 
situation is also present after 1989 in terms of R&D personnel and patents (see Radosevic 
and Auriol, 1999; Radosevic and Kutlaca, 1998). Due to the closed character of these 
economies this extensiveness was perhaps even more pronounced in S&T than in trade, and 
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hence the scale of the R&D system was significantly above what the income levels of these 
countries would suggest.  
 
The intermediate structural position of CEE within the wider Europe is very important in 
understanding what types of adjustment these countries are now faced with. As the starting 
position is intermediate, then a dual pattern of adjustment should develop. By a 'dual pattern' 
of adjustment, we mean a simultaneous downgrading of industrial and trade structure 
towards labour intensive and simpler products and an upgrading towards more advanced 
industries and products. This pattern has a built-in tendency towards polarisation in terms of 
industrial restructuring and productivity improvements between different industries. In 
terms of industrial structural and technical change, it implies simultaneous falling behind, 
catching-up and forging ahead. 
 
The intensity of inter-sectoral structural changes does not seem to correlate with the 
recovery of industrial production (table 5). For example, the biggest shifts in relative 
employment between branches have taken place in Bulgaria, whose industry gross output is 
by 67% lower in 1999 compared to the 1989. This suggests that the source of growth should 
not be sought for in inter-sectoral allocations but it is more likely to be found in intra-
sectoral and intra-firm sources. This seems logical given the longer period needed for inter-
sectoral changes to make their way.   
 
In addition, structural change in eastern Europe, apart from ‘greenfield’ FDI, is not 
yet driven by new investments in growing sectors. Given the absence of idle capacities and a 
large potential for efficiency gains, an output expansion during a transformational recovery is 
mostly based on non-investment sources of growth. As Polish case shows, an early 
expansion coupled with structural shifts and a decline in employment would be originated by 
unprecedented efficiency gains (Zukowski, 1998). The potential for efficiency gains without 
new investments are still large in some economies, in particular Russian (McKinsey, 1999). A 
slow decline in growth of productivity indicates that this ‘mode of growth’ is ending in 
central European economies. Any further productivity gains will require new investment in 
tangible and intangible assets. The ability to generate investments for a prolonged period of 
time is essential for the CEE to catch-up and grow. The structure of these investments will 
have to embody intangible assets (see section 3.2.). As the EU innovation surveys suggest, 
around half of the cost of innovation is related to physical investments or investments in 
embodied technology. A CEE innovation surveys suggests similar importance of both 
tangible and intangible investments (see Radosevic, 1999). 
 
 
 
3. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE: 
TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES 
 
The broad quantitative aspects of structural transformation of Eastern Europe summarized 
in section 2 show external manifestations of the transformation process. However, in order 
to understand determinants of innovation and industrial upgrading in Eastern Europe we 
would need to understand the interaction between institutional changes and changes at 
micro- and mezzo-levels.  In the core of this is the analysis of institutional transformation of 
their industrial systems. Given the large number of countries we cannot undertake country 
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specific analyses but will instead use country, sector or firm specific examples within an 
analysis, which tries to summarize the main transformation processes, in an increasingly 
heterogeneous or multi-layered CEE? 
 
In this section we will review three main micro-level aspects of the transformation of 
national industrial systems in eastern Europe:  
-     the way enterprises develop their business functions; 
- the way business functions between enterprises and related infrastructure are re-
distributed; 
- the ways in which insertion into world markets and production networks of Eastern 
European enterprises and sectors takes place.  
These will be analyzed through sections 3.1. – 3.3. The importance of these three aspects of 
the transformation of industrial systems in CEE stems from the structural and institutional 
weaknesses of the socialist economies, which have been inherited, with the introduction of 
market relationships and economic opening. Changes in these three aspects will largely 
determine the pace of industry upgrading in CEE. In section 3.4., we summarize the major 
issues from industry studies in CEE. Section 3.5., analyses who are the main restructuring 
agents in CEE and discuss the main issues on local innovation networks. We illustrate 
discussion with several cases presented in boxes.  
 
 
 
3. 1. RECONSTITUTION AND RESTRUCTURING OF ENTERPRISES  
 
During the communist period the State and party hierarchies managed the national 
industrial systems in Eastern Europe. As Yudanov (1997) points out Soviet enterprises never 
had a say in deciding on the strategic parameters of their production, i.e. on scope and range 
of production, prices, investments, wages and salaries and suppliers and purchasers. They 
were detached from the marketing networks, and their main task was to ensure current 
production. Enterprises were primarily production units with ‘dislocated’ business functions. 
R&D function was undertaken by industrial R&D institutes, exporting was the task for 
foreign trade organizations, domestic sales and marketing were tasks of ministries while 
finance function was rudimentary. Although differences in this respect were big between 
different sectors, between countries and over time (see Radosevic, 1999b) they convey the 
major inherited problem at a micro level.  
With the introduction of market relationship, the enterprises that were reduced to 
production units have been faced with tasks to strengthen and to fuse previously ‘dislocated’ 
business functions. The inherited differences between different Eastern European countries 
in the degree to which their enterprises had developed these functions during the communist 
period could explain much of micro-level problems today between central Europe, eastern 
Europe (Romania, Bulgaria) and the ex-USSR area7. During the last 10 years enterprises in 
Eastern Europe have undergone transformation from socialist production units to business 
units. This process included strengthening and fusion of previously 'dislocated' business 
functions like marketing, R&D, and, finance, discarding of social functions and ‘de-
verticalization’ of previously vertically integrated chains of production and supply.  
                                                 
7 For analysis of county differences in this respect based on patent data see Radosevic and Kutlaca (1999). 
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With the change of the economic system, particularly in the ex-USSR, enterprises, in 
fact, production units have found themselves in institutional vacuum. The coordination 
through plan collapsed, the major uncertainties regarding sales and markets have emerged, 
the old production linkages were broken, especially with the breakup of the USSR. In central 
Europe, where enterprise were more like business, rather than production, units the best of 
them managed to stand to challenge. For others, foreign takeovers or dependent 
subcontracting relationships were the solution. In Russia, the transitory solutions to these 
problems were: voluntary marketing associations to obtain inputs and secure sales on behalf 
of enterprises, commodity exchanges and holding companies or quasi associations (Buck et 
al, 1995). Subsequently these functions were taken over by industrial or financial - industrial 
groups, which internalized procurement, sales, marketing, and finance functions. 
The reconstitution of enterprises and their links with domestic and establishment of direct 
links with foreign partners brought significant transformation of competencies. This also 
meant relocation of previously dislocated functions between from innovation infrastructure.  
(industrial institutes) and ministries (sales, procurement and financial management) to 
enterprises. A reconstitution of enterprises and their links with other firms has revealed:  
· a lack of marketing skills, finance, organisation; 
· a lack of product system integration capabilities; 
· a lack of network building capabilities at firm level; 
 
A lack of marketing, finance and organization skills was expected given that these skills 
were never in the mandate of an individual enterprise during the socialism. As business’ 
surveys had shown, enterprises of all types of ownership had undertaken restructuring 
activities in these three areas. Financial discipline forced state-owned firms to slash their 
costs. However, that by itself had not improved their revenue performance.  
From national industrial systems perspective the biggest problem that enterprises have 
faced are system integration at product level and process integration at firm level. System 
integration at product level means that production and continuous improvement require 
integration of different functions (finance, R&D, engineering, procurement, production, and 
sale) whose integration is essential to innovation dynamics. Process integration at firm level means 
that production and innovation have to be organized across several tiers of suppliers that are 
all involved to different degrees, not only in production, but also in innovation. 
In market economy producers or users carry out these integrative functions. In the 
socialist period it was officially government administration or, in practice, central or design 
institutes that were taking on some of the functions of a network organiser. There was some 
system integration capability in institutes, but only for products not for processes. Design 
institutes also had much better international links and a better understanding of 
technological trends, of opportunities and capabilities of domestic industry and market 
potential. Customers or users were not strong initiators of change. Even when they had the 
money to make their own contracts in R&D, especially during the 1980s, they were not very 
concerned about the results. System integrators at the process level were ministries. 
Organization of processes that involved multi-technology products was especially difficult as 
this could involve several ministries. Sometimes this led to several parallel developments that 
resulted in a sort of rivalry. 
As business press evidence shows, presently the biggest problem for foreign 
companies is to find network organisers at firm level and system integrators at product 
level. Companies that are able to integrate the system at product level (combining 
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foreign with domestic solutions, customisation, etc.), and organise networks at firm 
level (manage domestic subcontractors) are in a much better position when entering 
into alliances. Those able to acquire strategic assets like distribution systems and 
supplier networks will basically shape the industrial structure in the future. 
 
 
Incentives for enterprise restructuring 
A fundamental theory underlying discussion of privatization effects on restructuring in the 
CEE is agency theory, which predicts that privatization will lead to greater efficiency by 
improving monitoring systems and providing managers with better incentives to perform. 
The importance of management incentives and private owners for innovation and structural 
change has been best confirmed throughout the socialist period. However, the 
overwhelming focus on ownership aspects of restructuring and on management incentives 
simplifies and distorts the picture of restructuring challenges. Ownership is an endogenous 
variable in restructuring process. There is a lack of unambiguous evidence of ownership and 
governance effects on firm restructuring and performance (EBRD, 1999; Estrin and Wright, 
2000). In overall, there is mixed relationship between privatization and various types of 
restructuring activities. The one ownership that has proven to be consistently supportive of 
deep restructuring and growth is control by a foreign strategic investor (EBRD, 1999, Carlin 
et al, 1995) and de novo private enterprises (EBRD, 1999; Bilsen and Konings, 1997). 
However, the success of foreign enterprises may be ascribed to their finance, technology and 
market access capabilities rather than to their better corporate governance (strategic 
investor). In addition, de novo private firms are relieved of the burden of old organizational 
routines, surplus of employees and outdated product mix. They are typically smaller than the 
old enterprises, and have generally simpler structures (EC, 2000). State-owned and privatized 
firms both suffer from disorganization in the links of production while de novo firms do not 
face such a problem (Konings and Walsh, 1999). The differences between privatized and 
state-owned firms are not significant or are contradictory of what would be expected from 
agency theory (Carlyn et al, 1995; EBRD, 1999; Bilsen and Konings, 1997) . The transfer of 
formal ownership on its own, did not generate radical alterations in enterprise behavior and 
structures (Whitley and Czaban, 1998).. Restructuring of enterprises is a much more complex 
and multi-faceted activity where direct effects of the competitive and institutional 
environments and managerial characteristics play important role. A simplified approach to 
restructuring which is derived from the principal agent problem as the decisive one abstracts 
from the complexities of the institutional environment of CEE. 
Also, the effects of imposition of hard budget constraints on firm behavior have shown to 
be inconsistent with the expectations that hardening of financial discipline and competition 
will induce all necessary restructuring behavior at the firm level. Some results do indicate that 
the likelihood of restructuring a firm increases significantly if there are hard budget 
constraints. However, the degree of competition should be moderate rather than excessive 
(EBRD, 1999). Other results suggest that the financial discipline is not sufficient condition 
for revenue creation and entrepreneurship, but is sufficient condition for cost efficiency 
(Frydman et al, 2000). 
In overall, from a conceptual perspective it seems that the corporate restructuring may be 
better understood and explained using a synthesis of principal – agency framework and 
strategic management perspective (Filatotchev, 2000). In reality, restructuring is much less 
amenable to generalizations. Even very successful cases of domestic-led restructuring of the 
CEE enterprises have come only as a result of a positive outcome on a series of highly 
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interconnected issues each of which was complex and fraught with potential for failure 
(Johnson et al, 1996). 
 
 
Building organizational capabilities 
 
Restructuring strategies of enterprises in the CEECs have been explored with the primary 
interest to its links with the corporate governance. Usually, these strategies are termed as 
active, passive and ambiguous, or ‘deep’ and ‘reactive’, or ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’. There is little 
evidence of ‘deep’ restructuring. The most common type of action were those that were not 
threatening to the insiders in the enterprise and which did not require major investment 
(Carlin et al, 1995). Privatization has influenced restructuring clearly in the case of foreign 
ownership: there is a very close correlation between major capital investment programs and 
foreign ownership. Most firms made short-run adjustments to output and inputs use; fewer 
firms began to make strategic adjustments (Brada, 1998). 
 
Institutional environment of transition economy has affected the scale and scope of 
enterprise restructuring. Any strategic choice that firms make is affected by the formal and 
informal constraints of their institutional framework. This led to a variety of adjustment 
paths like sustainable real adjustment or sophisticated rent-seeking (Kuznetsov, 1997).  The 
inhibiting effect of institutional constraints in the immediate environment is particularly 
strong in Russia where enterprises operate in an environment where formal and informal 
economy are closely intertwined (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998; Polonsky and Aivazian, 2000). 
Despite this analysts see signs that Russian enterprises ‘have made substantial progress in 
adjusting to the new market conditions, in a manner similar to enterprise in central and 
eastern Europe’ (Fan and Schaffer, 1994, p. 182), or they have made restructuring moves 
that still remain fragile (Izymov et al, 2000). 
Literature also suggests that the strategy of growth of enterprises in ex-centrally-
planned economies is specific when compared to Western market economy model. There 
are serious constraints in some CEE economies for growth through internal expansion 
and/or acquisitions. Enterprises grow by forming networks of firms, a growth that can be 
characterized as networking or boundary blurring. (Peng, W. Mike and P. S. Heath, 1996). The 
institutional features of the Eastern European economies, which are partly similar to those 
of other emerging markets, lead to generation of diversified business groups. Russian 
financial - industrial groups (FIGs) (Popov, 1998; Freinkman, 1995; Petkoski, 1997; Perotti 
and Gelfer, 1999), ‘recombinets’ in Hungary (Stark, 1996), bank - industry - privatisation funds 
networks in Czech R (Hayri and McDermott, 1999) and conglomerates in Poland 
(Radosevic, 2001). These are examples of organizational forms by which companies try to 
overcome institutional weaknesses in the economic environment or make use of them. In 
that respect, their emergence can be attributed to factors similar to those operating in other 
semi-industrialized economies (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 1999; Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
Whether these organizations will persist will depend on the progress in institutional 
transformation of these economies. 
 Historical analysis suggest that the creation and evolution of modern managerial 
enterprises and the organizational capabilities developed within these enterprises will be the 
major force in shaping economic growth and competitive strengths of CEE. (Chandler, 
1993). The nature of organizational structures and differences in competencies in 
organizational coordination determine differential possibilities for growth not only of 
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individual firms but also of the economies where they operate (Dosi, 1997). Hence, we can 
expect that differences in growth of CEE economies will be increasingly based on national 
differences in organizational capabilities of their enterprises rather than on differences in 
transition policies. The reconstitution of the ex-socialist combinates into enterprises with the 
fully developed organizational capabilities and generation of new enterprises has substantially 
progressed in all CEE economies. Ranges of organizational capabilities that have been 
developed in this period vary greatly between different countries and differ substantially 
between domestic and foreign firms, de novo and old firms. Unfortunately, we know very little 
on the nature of organizational structures between different CEE countries and differences 
in their learning potential. The majority of research on the CEE has been so far focused on 
market relationships within the framework of ‘transition’ and has neglected factors that lead 
to differences in organizational capabilities. However, these factors are essential for 
understanding determinants and nature of industrial and innovation upgrading in CEE.   
 
 
3. 2. RESTRUCTURING, EROSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
BASE 
 
In the section 3.1., we briefly analyzed the transformation of the main carrier of 
innovation process – enterprise – from an organizational perspective. In this section, we 
analyze the various aspects of knowledge generation and diffusion in CEE countries. A 
central institution in this process is an enterprise, the only organization that transforms 
technology into products. In that respect, the enterprise plays an essential role in generation 
and diffusion of knowledge. However, in innovation and diffusion process enterprises do 
not operate isolated of the external sources of knowledge. They rely on other enterprises, on 
users and suppliers as well as on infrastructure institutions, like testing labs, R&D 
companies, universities, etc.  
The importance of both firm-specific knowledge as well as broad and diversified 
knowledge base is important for structural change to take place. Industrial upgrading is non-
linear process with different threshold levels in terms of knowledge base required. A recent 
example of the importance of broad knowledge base for development is the case of Korea 
(see Ernst, 1998) which has developed narrow knowledge base focused on mass 
manufacturing, accompanied by an insufficient critical mass of R&D and inefficiencies in the 
public innovation system. In order to upgrade, Korea needs to broaden its knowledge base 
to cover product design, market development, the design of key components, and the 
provision of high-end knowledge-intensive support services. From the CEE perspective, this 
example is quite illustrative as it shows that industrial upgrading and growth require both a 
diversified knowledge base as well as specialized and narrow manufacturing-specific skills. 
Quite opposite to Korea, the CEE economies have weak firm-specific organizational 
capabilities and relatively large capacities in public R&D or at least had until recently. Their 
top scientific competencies were in few areas around physics and chemistry (see Kozlowski, 
Radosevic and Ircha, 1999). The nature of production process in socialism forced enterprises 
to acquire quite extensive ad hoc skills in resolving bottlenecks, adjusting material and 
processes to shifting requirements. They also had large imitative skills in broad range of 
industries. In a new context, much of these capabilities have become obsolete while others 
represent a good basis for upgrading. Restructuring, erosion and building of a new 
knowledge base accompany restructuring of CEE. In this section, we discuss the 
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transformation of knowledge base in business as well as in public sector. The analysis is 
based on several indicators like ISO9000 quality certificates, innovation surveys, R&D and 
qualification level of labor force. 
 
Quality management 
 
Central and eastern European enterprises (CEE) have inherited from the socialist 
period excess physical resources, but lack financial and managerial resources. In the last ten 
years, they had to learn and develop capabilities to use the available resources effectively. An 
indication of the mastery of organizational capabilities is the introduction of quality control 
systems and standards. Quality is of paramount importance for the exporters. Innovation 
surveys in CEE also show that the highest percentage of companies innovators consider 
improving product quality as very important objective of their innovation activities (see 
Radosevic, 1999). The improved quality depends on introduction and wide diffusion of 
technology management techniques. Among these, quality standards, industry specific and 
general standards, play an important role. ISO9000 is known as generic management 
standard. The definition of quality in ISO9000 refers to those features of a product or 
service that are required by the customer. The extent of its introduction in an economy 
indicates the degree to which companies are concerned with quality management. In turn, 
this should have positive effects on their export competitiveness and should lead to 
increased market shares.  
Table 6 shows the relative penetration rates of ISO9000 certificates or the number of 
firms per 1mn population that have introduced them and the average rate in 1994-99 period, 
unless otherwise stated. 
Table 6: Number of ISO9000 certificates per 1mn population and the average rates 
of growth, 1994-95 (unless otherwise stated) 
 ISO9000/ 
1mn pop 
Average rate 
1994-99 
Slovenia 251.0 178.7% 
Hungary 164.4 228.6% 
Czech Rep 141.5 209.0% 
Slovakia 115.0 219.6% 
Croatia* 26.9 278.7% 
Poland 19.8 316.9% 
Estonia* 18.6 238.4% 
Bulgaria** 11.6 285.4% 
Lithuania** 10.8 259.7% 
Macedonia** 10.5 260.4% 
Romania* 9.5 214.0% 
Latvia*** 5.8 339.1% 
Moldova**** 2.3 152.8% 
Belarus**** 1.4 208.2% 
Ukraine 1.1 208.4% 
Russia 0.9 218.3% 
Coefficient of variation 1.5 0.2 
*1995-99, **1996-99, ***1997-99,****1998-99,  
Source: ISO9000 and ISO14000 in brief 
International Standards Organization, www.iso.ch 
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We observe big differences in the rate of penetration of quality management systems but 
relatively homogenous rates of growth, especially given different initial years when quality 
systems have been introduced. Economies of central Europe have significantly higher rates 
of penetration of quality management systems. These differences in per capita reflect 
differences in income levels per capita, in progress in transition and in trade openness8. 
However, trade openness explains the greatest part of variations among individual 
economies. This suggests that generic standards, like ISO9000, have become a prerequisite 
for successful exporting but also that export is important in developing organizational 
capabilities. 
 
 
Scale of innovative efforts 
 
 Industrial upgrading of CEE depends on the scale and intensity of innovation 
activities of its enterprises. Here we use data from the large scale innovation surveys that 
have been undertaken in four CEE countries (Poland, Romani, Russia and Slovenia) in order 
to explore to which extent this process has taken place. However, we have to bear in mind 
that the international comparisons of innovation surveys are still flawed and have numerous 
methodological and interpretative problems9.  
The proxy for the spread of innovative activities is the percentage of innovating 
firms over the total number of firms. Innovating firms are defined as those that have 
introduced at least one product or process innovation over the period analyzed. Table 7 
shows the shares of innovative firms in the EU and CEE. Based on these data we can draw 
three conclusions. First, the shares of innovative firms in CEE are below the EU average of 
53% of innovative firms. Moreover, they are at the bottom of the EU league. This conform 
to the overviews of enterprise case studies in CEE which suggests that the most common 
form of restructuring is passive adjustment, not deep restructuring (Carlyn et al, 1995).10 The 
introduction of innovation by definition requires a deep organizational change and long-term 
horizon, two objectives, which are still difficult to meet in the current institutional 
environment of the most of CEE economies.  
 
Table 7: Shares of innovative firms in EU and CEECs 
 
Ireland 0.72 
Germany 0.67 
Poland Ia 0.619 
Belgium 0.61 
Netherlands 0.57 
Denmark 0.56 
                                                 
8Trade openness measured as percent of trade in GDP explains 49% of variation in ISO900 certificates per 
capita in CEE in simple regression. When we exclude Estonia whose number of certificates is far below of 
what would be expected given its trade openness then a simple regression can explain 69% of variation. 
9 For an extensive analysis on this see Radosevic, 1999b. 
10Passive adjustment are responses like accumulation of debt and arrears, non-payment of suppliers, 
accumulation of inventories, etc. Active or deep adjustment are responses like new organization, export  
orientation, cost control, quality development, altering product mix, etc. These latter activities involve 
innovation activities. 
 20
Norway 0.53 
EU 0.5 
France 0.39 
Poland IIb  0.376 
Spain 0.37 
Luxembourg 0.37 
Italy  0.34 
Slovenia  0.319 
Romania 0.283 
Russia Ic 0.224 
Russia IId 0.06 
 a  1992, b 1994-96, c 1992-94, d  1995-96 
Source: Radosevic (1999). Also, see source for methodology and data sources. 
 
Second, ranking of the four Eastern European countries is very closely related to their 
growth rates.11 When we correlate the shares of innovative firms of four Eastern European 
economies with their levels of GDP in 1997 compared to their 1989 levels we get a very high 
correlation coefficient of 0.96.12 This may suggest that broadly perceived innovative 
dynamics or the share of firms that are involved in innovative activities is closely related to 
the dynamics of economic recovery. 
 
Third, in both Poland and Russia the share of innovative enterprises between the beginning 
of the 1990s and the mid-1990s has fallen. In Poland the share of innovative enterprises 
dropped from 62% (1992) to 38% (1994-96) while in Russia the share fell from 22% (1992-
94) to 6% (1995-96). How should we interpret this downward fall in the scale of innovation 
activities in two countries with such different economic situations? Does it contradict to a 
strong correlation between the rate of economic recovery and the scale of innovative 
activities mentioned before? We should bear in mind that the shares of innovative firms do 
not reflect the economic relevance of innovative activities, but indicate the extent of search 
efforts by enterprises. A high share of enterprises involved in innovation does not mean that 
the share of sales based on innovations will also be high. As we show in Radosevic (1999) 
the link between these two variables is far from direct.  
 
A high share of enterprises that were innovating at the outset of transition then becomes 
quite plausible. These innovative activities did not result in business relevant innovations, ie, 
in a high share of sales based on innovative products and processes. As a part of their 
diversification efforts, enterprises are launching new products which then have to be 
withdrawn from the market due to their marketing, cost or quality problems. The pure 
technical novelty of the product for enterprise and domestic market very often turns out to 
be insufficient for commercialization. It seems that in both Poland and Russia a certain 
threshold has been reached whereby enterprises decreased the extent of their search efforts 
as innovation activities turned out to be not so profitable in new market conditions. Yet, at 
the same time, the difference in search efforts as expressed in the shares of innovative 
                                                 
11Here we compare only the results of the second Polish and Russian innovation surveys. 
12Indexes of economic recovery 1997/1989 is for Poland 111.8, Slovenia 98.3, Romania 82.5 and for Russia 
57.5.  
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enterprises in Poland and Russia reflects strongly the different economic situations of these 
two countries.  
The general downward trend in the scale of search efforts of enterprises seemed to be 
accompanied by an increasing polarisation in the scale of innovative activities across 
individual sectors. In the case of Poland, in 1992 the most innovative sector had 80.1% of 
innovative enterprises while the least innovative had 49.5%. In the 1994-96 period the 
difference was 78% vs 8.3% respectively. So, the intersectoral difference in the scale of 
innovative activities has broadened from 30.6% to 70.3%. This polarisation in the scale of 
innovative activities suggests that at the outset of transition most enterprises, irrespective of 
the difficulties, were searching for new products and processes. However, the search process 
became highly differentiated across different sectors as some sectors have managed to 
transform innovations into sales while others did not.  
In the last ten years, we have seen a fast growth of small firms in all Eastern 
European economies. While in this respect the industrial structure is becoming more 
heterogeneous, it is not yet clear what is the role of small firms in innovation dynamics of 
these countries. The role of small firms is substantial in terms of employment and income 
generation their role is much less obvious with regard to the generation of innovations in 
CEE.  
Table 8 shows that the share of innovative firms is significantly larger in the group of 
large enterprises for Poland and Russia. A lower share of innovative large firms, when 
compared to medium sized firms in Slovenia probably reflects the scale of the restructuring 
problems in their several large companies.  
 
Table 8: Share of innovative enterprises by size of enterprises *, 1996-97 
Small  Medium Large 
Poland 2.1% 46.5% 51.4%
Russia 1.7% 16.6% 81.7%
Slovenia 12.4% 48.1% 39.5%
Source: R&D and innovation statistics in candidate countries and the Russian 
Federation, Data 1996-97, EC, Theme 9, R&D, 2000 
 *Small (20-49), Medium (50-249), Large (250+) 
 
In this respect the firm size - innovation relationship in Eastern Europe seems to be the 
same as in the EU economies. Despite expectations at the outset of transition that new 
innovation-oriented SMEs would replace large enterprises, large firms continue to undertake 
the majority of innovation activities in CEE. Innovation dynamics in the economy depends 
on the high share of innovative firms in all classes. From that perspective, the problem in the 
Eastern Europe seems to be much more (i) a low share of innovative firms in general rather 
than in a particular size group, (ii) the interaction between large and small firms. 
 
 
Factors of innovation 
 
A comparison of the innovation activities of EU and the CEE enterprises (see Radosevic, 
1999b) shows differences, which stem from the different business environments and cost 
structures, but also convergence in the objectives of innovation activities. Eastern European 
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enterprises still operate in a different business environment, which influences the pattern of 
innovation activities. First, access to new markets is a more important objective for Eastern 
European than for EU enterprises. In view of the previous closeness of the Eastern 
European economies as well as the demand problems of their enterprises, this seems logical. 
Second, the reduction of material and energy consumption stands high as an objective of 
innovation, while in EU firms it is the reduction of the share of wage funds in costs which 
typically is high.  
 
However, there are several features of innovation activities in Eastern Europe that have 
already become similar to those in EU industries. First, the most important objectives of 
innovation in both regions coincide: product quality, increase in or maintenance of market 
share and extension of the product range within the main field. Second, the sources of 
information for innovation are similar in both CEE and the EU. It is internal sources and 
customers rather than fairs and exhibitions, which are the most important sources of 
information for innovation in both the EU and CEE. These similarities show that the 
behavior of enterprises in CEE conform to a market incentive environment. 
 
Innovation expenditures 
 
The differences in the structure of innovation expenditures should indicate differences in the 
main types of innovation activities. Taking into account differences in developmental levels 
between the EU and the CEE we would expect that the structure of innovation expenditures 
should be significantly different. Countries that are behind the technology frontier should 
spent relatively more on embodied technologies and on downstream innovation activities 
like reverse engineering, product and process imitation than on R&D.  
 
The analysis of the innovation expenditures by Evangelista et al (1996) shows that, first, the 
distribution of innovation costs is relatively coherent over all EU countries. If innovation 
costs reflect the scope of different innovation activities than the mix of innovative activities 
appears rather similar across EU. The second conclusion based on the EU innovation survey 
is that the industrial innovative process consists, first and foremost, of the purchase and use 
of ‘embodied’ technologies (innovative machinery and plants), which account for 50% of 
total expenditures on innovation (ibid). Third, among the ‘intangible’ innovation 
expenditures R&D activities are confirmed to be a central component of the technological 
activities of firms (see Evangelista et al, 1997, fig 2, p 529). Fourth, across all European 
countries expenditure-wise, the acquisition of ‘disembodied’ technology through patent and 
licences emerges as a secondary innovation component when compared to the technological 
sources (ibid). 
 
 
Table 9: Innovation expenditures in manufacturing sector by economic activity, 1996-97 
 Intramural  
R&D 
Extramural 
R&D 
Acquisition 
of 
machinery 
& 
equipment 
Acquisition of 
other external 
technology 
Industrial 
design & 
other 
production 
preparation 
 
Training 
Market 
introduction 
Poland 9.3% 3.1% 53.3% 3.3% 25.3% 0.9% 4.9% 
Romania 5.9% 2.7% 88.4% 1.7% 1.4%   
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Slovenia 49.8% 6.2% 24.3% 6.6% 5.1% 1.5% 6.5% 
Russia 16.8% 6.6% 50.0% 2.4% 21.6% 0.7% 1.8% 
Source: R&D and innovation statistics in candidate countries and the Russian Federation   
Data 1996-97, EC, Theme 9, R&D, 2000      
 
Table 9 shows the structure of innovation expenditures in four Eastern European 
economies. When compared to the EU data we can observe few differences. First, the 
structure of expenditures is not coherent across four countries reflecting differences in 
development levels (Slovenia vs. Romania) as well as differences in industry structures. 
Second, the share of embodied technology is higher in CEE, except in Slovenia, whose 
structure of innovation expenditures is not typical for the region. This conforms to our 
expectations that in economies that are lagging behind the share of embodied technology 
should be higher than in advanced economies. Third, among the ‘intangible’ innovation 
expenditures R&D activities are a central component of the technological activities of firm, 
as in the EU. Fourth, the share of external sources of ‘intangible’ technology is less 
important. This applies both to extramural R&D as well as to patents and licenses 
(acquisition of other external technology). 
The data suggest that the role for extramural R&D (industrial) institutes that were 
the backbone of the socialist S&T systems has diminished. In the post-socialist period the 
enterprises are embodying innovation by building their own technological capabilities. 
However, this process differs considerably between countries and the innovation system in 
the CEE countries still carries strong features of the past. While intramural R&D activities 
are gaining importance there is still a strong dependence, in particular of the ex-Soviet Union 
countries on extramural sources of technology. For example, out of 3803 innovative 
enterprises in 1992-94 in Russia 47% have received unpatented licences, which includes 
R&D contracts and purchase of industrial know how, etc (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 
1999).13 These are mainly the R&D results of industrial institutes who often operate in quasi-
arm’s length relationships with enterprises. Analysis of the determinants of the innovative 
activities in the post-socialist period shows that both, extra- and intra-mural R&D activity, 
play a role in the innovative activities of enterprises14. First, the combination of extra-mural 
and intra-mural R&D activities explains 75% of variation in the share of innovative 
enterprises. Second, a coefficient for in-house R&D almost twice that for contract R&D 
suggests that the Russian innovation system is moving towards a situation where the in-
house R&D activities of enterprises are playing a more important role than the extra-mural 
R&D activities. However, the role of extra-mural R&D activities still continues to be 
significant suggesting that some elements of the Soviet R&D model as described by 
                                                 
13According to Gokhberg and Kuznetsova (1999), only 5.8% of innovative Russian enterprises use patent 
licences and 10.3% patent rights. 
14 The best result we get is the following regression:  
Y= 0.09X1 + 0.162X2 
t-stat (4.91) (2.467) 
Prob (0.00) (0.03) 
R2 adj. = 0.75 
Y = share of innovative enterprises 
X1 = contract R&D 
X2 = in house R&D 
For a detailed account see Radosevic (1999b). 
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Gokhberg (1997) are still operating. This also conforms to our more descriptive accounts of 
R&D in the CEE (see Radosevic, 1999c). 
R&D system plays a relatively small direct role in the current performance of the 
CEE economies. However, we should not ignore the importance of R&D system just based 
on its current role. The role of R&D is likely to increase with return to growth. In fact, 
restructuring of R&D is one the key preconditions for further industrial upgrading. In 
addition, its role cannot be evaluated only through its direct contribution to innovation but 
also through its contribution to education and transfer of research methodologies and 
techniques (Pavitt).  
 Figure 1 shows the share of expenditures in R&D in GDP for Eastern European 
countries. 
 
 
Figure 1 
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From having very high shares of R&D expenditures at the end of the socialism, which 
ranged from 2.5% to 1% (1990) of GDP Eastern European economies investments in R&D 
fell to a range between 0.5% to 1.4% (1999) of GDP. This downfall can be disaggregated 
into three distinct periods. First, in the period between 1990 and 1993/94, with the falling 
GDPs the share of expenditures for R&D also declined sharply leading to a very high 
absolute declines in funding of large R&D systems. This was followed by the period of 
stabilisation (1993/94 to 1996) in which decline continued but at significantly lower rate. 
From 1996, signs of recovery in some economies, in both absolute and relative funding of 
R&D, have emerged. After average annual decrease of 13% in 1991-96 period, the relative 
share of R&D in average grows by 3.2% annually in 1997-199 period. From industrial 
upgrading perspective, it is important what has happened to business enterprise sector R&D. 
Figure 2 shows that that the shares of R&D funded by business enterprise sector have 
remained relatively stable over the whole period. In other words, business enterprise sector 
has shared the destiny of the overall decline, absolute and relative, of R&D sector. In 
addition, national differences in the share of R&D funded by business have remained 
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suggesting that the transition could not change patterns of funding that seem to have strong 
structural features15. 
 
Figure 2: Share of R&D financed by business enterprise sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A simultaneous fall in government funding and weak demand for R&D from industry have 
blocked sectoral structural change within R&D systems which adjusted by shrinking. As we 
analyzed elsewhere, (Radosevic and Auriol, 1999) downsizing of the R&D systems in 
Eastern Europe was not systematically linked to a specific individual factor on the demand 
or supply side. Probably, it is the combination of demand side factors (annual changes in 
GDP and investments) and supply side policies (budgetary R&D policy) that in the end have 
shaped trends in R&D spending. Neither government nor market demand for R&D could 
buffer this fall. However, this does not mean that there was not change at micro-level in 
R&D system.  
 
 
Changing nature of R&D 
 
A comprehensive inter-country evidence on the transformation of S&T systems in Eastern 
Europe of Meske (1998) shows that the transformation process in R&D system was 
characterized by a few common phases, each characterised by different types of changes. 
                                                 
15 A high shares of R&D funding by business sector in Czech Republic and very low in Estonia are the result of 
differences in industry structure, especially in terms of the role of large firms. A low share of R&D funding by 
industry in Russia and Romania has its counterpart in high share of government funding of business sector 
R&D.  This situation is generally rare in market economies and can be taken as an indicator of the slow 
restructuring in R&D or legacy of the Soviet system. 
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The first step in the transformation process was the dissolution and fragmentation of the old 
S&T systems. This occurred due to the partial withdrawal of the state from its 
responsibilities for R&D by dispensing with state planning, dissolving ministries and other 
bodies, and by granting the universities and Academies autonomy. This withdrawal was 
accompanied by significant budget reductions, which in most countries far exceeded the 
general level of economic downturn as a reaction to the prior overestimation of science. The 
second phase is characterised by the consolidation of the “surviving” portions of the old 
S&T systems and their transformation into actors with a position and behavior adjusted to 
the new environment. In this phase, new organisational bodies in S&T policy were formed 
and new rules implemented. The changes in the institutional system encouraged a variety of 
micro-strategies to embrace new opportunities or cope with uncertainties in demand for 
R&D and reductions in funding. In the current (third) phase countries are faced with the   
challenge to further implement rules to fund R&D activities, and expand relationships with 
domestic and international organisations. This, in particular, relates to an appropriate 
quantitative balance of activities in S&T organisation and a balance of different types of 
organisations in S&T system. The classification of countries into different groups (see 
Meske, 1998) shows that there is a clear congruence between progress in economic recovery 
and institutional transformation, and the transformation of S&T systems. In other words, 
there is a broad compatibility between the general system transformation and restructuring 
of S&T systems.  
S&T systems that had to undergo large funding reductions and face new political and 
economic system could not retain their old form. Thus the nature of S&T systems in the 
CEE, especially in central Europe, has changed significantly. The most important aspects are 
changes in terms of: 
 
· organisations (higher education, Academies of Science, R&D institutes, design institutes, 
industrial or service enterprises); 
· functions (basic and applied research, development, engineering, technical services, 
teaching, production, services); 
· modes of funding (institutional, programme, project, and grant funding, co-funding). 
 
An extensive analyses of these changes in Radosevic (1999d) and Meske (1998) shows that 
there is a lack of congruence between changes in organizations, functions and funding 
modes in R&D system. These changes have occurred at different pace in different S&T sub-
sectors (university, industrial R&D, academy R&D) and in different countries. Industrial 
R&D are the biggest structural problem in transformation of S&T systems. Public R&D 
systems have either consolidated or still operate in survival mode, especially in ex-Soviet 
Union economies, Romania and Bulgaria. However, the biggest challenges still lay ahead: 
how to gear S&T much more towards the diffusion of knowledge rather than only 
generation of new knowledge. 
The capability to absorb foreign-generated knowledge is an essential feature of 
successful catching-up countries. The S&T systems of CEECs have been geared in the past 
primary towards the generation of new knowledge, very often of ‘reinventing the wheel’ 
type. They now have to shift from R&D to diffusion-oriented S&T system. So far, their 
R&D systems are not yet geared to this task and remain in a kind of hybrid mode16. 
                                                 
16 SeeRadosevic, 1999d for detailed account. 
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Absorptive capacities: education 
 
The capacity to diffuse knowledge throughout economy becomes essential for 
catching-up in knowledge based economy. This depends on whether R&D system is geared 
towards that objective. However, much more important factor for improved knowledge 
distribution capacity is the general and vocation specific level of education of population. In 
table 10 we show the educational structure of the economically active population for a 
selected CEE countries. 
Table 10 - Economically Active Population by the level of education, 1998 
 1st and less 2nd,1st stage 2nd,2st stage 3rd 
CZR 0.6% 9.9% 79.0% 10.5% 
EST 1.3% 11.5% 46.0% 41.2% 
HUN 1.3% 22.7% 62.0% 14.0% 
POL 17.6% 35.3% 31.8% 15.3% 
SLO 3.1% 20.4% 62.2% 14.3% 
Source: Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 20001, based on ILO. 
Table 10 suggests that the structure of education in CEE is thin on the edges, with low 
shares of both least educated and people with high education. The share of the economically 
active population with secondary education, especially in Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, is very high. When compared to EU economies, Eastern Europe, with exception of 
Poland, has a very low share of population with the 1st level of education and lower, ranging 
from 0.6% in the Czech Republic to 3.1% in Slovenia. With the exception of Estonia, 
Eastern Europe has a low share of population with the 3 rd level education, which ranges 
from 10.5% to 15.3%. Estonia has the highest share amongst the countries analysed (41%), 
which, together with high share of secondary level education, gives it the best education 
structure. 
This educational structure has few important implications for industrial upgrading of 
Eastern Europe. First, the low share of economically active population (with the exception 
of Estonia) with 3 rd level education may represent difficulties in absorption and diffusion of 
new IT based technologies in services and industry, especially in adoption of IT but less in 
use. Second, the high share of population with secondary level education in Eastern Europe 
have undergone vocational education, i.e. their skills are relatively specialised which may 
present problems in economy-wide restructuring. Third, the favourable structure of the 
general level of education in Eastern Europe may present a problem if not accompanied by 
training and retraining programmes. On average, workers in CEE would need around 6 
months of training to achieve the level of productivity in Western Europe. (EBRD, 2000b) 
They lack general adaptability and flexibility, which higher levels of education develop. Also, 
their technical and IT education is considered as insufficient (EBRD, ibid.). In contrast to 
foreign investors, domestic enterprises and public institutions have not been able so far to 
promote retraining activities to the extent required by the scale of restructuring challenges. 
This is one of the core policy issues for further industrial upgrading in Eastern Europe. 
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3. 3. OPENING AND MODES OF INSERTION INTO GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
Eastern Europe is reintegrating into the international economy at a time when trade 
patterns are being strongly shaped by the complex integration strategies of MNCs involving 
the construction of international production networks across national boundaries. The issue 
is whether industrial upgrading in Eastern Europe is already taking place through 
participation in global value chains and, if not, under what conditions can policy, trade and 
production- based integration become vehicles for industrial upgrading.   
Integration of Eastern Europe into international economy carries four specific 
features (Lemoine, 1998). First, there are already visible several tiers of Eastern European 
newcomers in the internationalization process. In rough terms, the scale and features of 
international integration differ significantly between central Europe, Balkans, and European 
CIS economies. Second, a high share of industry in Eastern Europe when compared to its 
income levels, even after significant downsizing during the 1990s (see EBRD, 1999), suggest 
that the scope for industry integration is high. Third, the institutional integration into the EU 
through accession process and trade openness of most of the Eastern European economies 
suggest that there are much more diverse ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors operating towards the 
integration into global value chains than elsewhere. Finally, trade patterns of Eastern 
Europe, which show a multiplicity of adjustment patterns (see 2.1.), suggest that we will 
increasingly observe a multiplicity of patterns of integration in terms of different production 
and technological roles that specific sectors or countries in Eastern Europe will occupy. 
Understanding the nature of international production networks in Eastern Europe 
should tell us more about their dynamic potential. The discussion and research on this has 
already started. For example, Ellingstadt (1997) argues that we are witnessing the emergence 
of technologically stagnant 'East' - 'West' networks which resemble maquilladora types of 
relationships. Along this line is also the thinking that Eastern Europe  will be a case of 
'dependent national capitalism, integrated into the capitalist world economy on the now 
standard liberal lines, yielding a tolerable living standard for most of their citizens, but with 
the permanent high unemployment and inequalities typical of the semi-periphery' (Radice, 
1995, p. 307). In this version of the story CEE can operate only as a low cost skilled labour 
base with limited possibilities for technological integration. 
In the alternative story, Eastern Europe could operate as a complement to Western 
production. As an argument in this direction Zysman and Schwartz (1998, p. 15) point to the 
example of German firms, which are drawing on the low cost skilled labour but to develop 
'distinctive complementary, production'.  
The testing of these two propositions requires more research that is empirical. (See 
Radosevic, 2001b, for an overview). Here, we will provide the available evidence and 
highlight the main issues from the perspective of industrial upgrading.  
The very nature of the contemporary world economy is the existence of close 
interconnections between finance, trade, FDI, and different forms of subcontracting and 
alliances. In continuation, we review the role of each of these channels of integration of 
Eastern Europe. 
Financial integration 
Financial integration is an essential element of economic integration of Eastern 
Europe. According to EBRD (1998) three-quarters of all private net inflows entered the 
region during 1996-98. FDI are making up an increasing share of these flows but they still 
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amounted to only one-third of the private capital inflows in 1997 and are attracted primarily 
to leading transition economies. The distribution of private equity issues has remained 
restricted to central Europe. Portfolio flows into the government securities markets have 
characterized a number of countries at less advanced stages in transition (ex. Russia,  
Romania) (EBRD, 1998, p. 77, 84). The most remarkable difference between the Eastern 
European countries are the terms of external borrowing, which are far more favorable for 
the more advanced transition economies (ibid. p.85). 
 However, the effects of financial integration of Eastern Europe are not confined to 
the level of financial aggregates. Financial globalization is also directly changing strategies of 
MNCs towards Eastern Europe as well as of their enterprises and in that way is influencing 
the patterns of production integration. For example, foreign acquisitions amount to about 
50% of FDI in Eastern Europe (UNCTAD, 1997). Also, Eastern European enterprises 
increasingly rely on non-bank investors through bond issues and global depositary receipts 
(GDRs). These trends are driven by the opportunities offered by the liberalization of 
markets for corporate assets and opportunities to raise capital in quasi-equity forms, but also 
by underdeveloped capital markets in Eastern Europe. 
 
Trade integration 
Trade integration between Eastern Europe and the EU has developed quite 
extensively. For example, from 1988 to 1995 central Europe accounted for half of the 
increase in EU imports of industrial manufactured products from emerging regions outside 
the OECD. (Zysman and Schwartz, 1998). The trade structure has been significantly 
changed as well. For example, exports in 1996 were only 72%, similar to those in 1998 for 
the region as a whole (Eichengreen and Kohl, 1998, p. 21) 
 The emerging trade patterns of Eastern Europe cannot be explained without taking 
into account their micro-basis and the strategies of foreign companies, which are strongly 
shaping FDI and subcontracting patterns in the CEE (Radosevic and Hotopp, 1998). ECE 
(1994) also finds a clear link between FDI and trade developments as well as the strong 
contribution of FDI to export. Changes in FDI, not in relative prices, have been important 
in explaining trade performance (Eichengreen and Kohl, 1998) Also, the Association 
Agreements are unlikely to have played a dominant role in shaping Eastern European trade. 
The most important factors in shaping trade patterns are FDI and outward processing traffic 
(OPT). Their conclusion is that if trade policy mattered it did so via its effects on OPT and 
FDI (ibid., p. 33). This is confirmed also by data on foreign investment enterprises, which 
are much more trade intensive when compared to domestic enterprises (Hunya, 2000). 
 
Foreign direct investments 
 
International production integration of Eastern Europe is relatively the most 
researched from the FDI perspective. The general conclusion on direct effects of FDI is 
quite positive. For example, Eichengreen and Kohl (1998, p. 39) conclude that '(t)he 
correlation between FDI flows and increase in unit values, shifts in factor intensity and the 
other measures of trade performance .. strongly suggest that FDI is integrating the more 
advanced economies into multinational production networks, shifting these economies 
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towards R&D-intensive and human capital intensive products'.  FDI bring capital but also 
transfer assets from less to owners that are more efficient. This latter aspect is very 
important in the Eastern Europe where foreign owners have advantages in terms of 
corporate governance as well as in terms of easier access to capital markets and technology. 
The result is a big difference in terms of productivity between domestic and foreign owned 
firms. 
 
Rate of presence. Table 11-show the scale and intensity of FDI presence in Eastern 
Europe. Labour productivity (sales per employee) in foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) is 
from 1.5 (Estonia) to almost 3 times (Hungary) higher than in domestic enterprises. In that 
respect, FDI play a very positive direct role in these economies. For example, this led to 
higher productivity in foreign owned sector in Hungary than in Austria. In terms of capital 
productivity (sales per assets) differences between foreign and domestic enterprises are not 
high when compared to labour productivity17.  
 
Table 11: Penetration of FDI in Eastern European economies 
Foreign investment enterprises in percent of domestic enterprises, 1998 
 
 
Labour  
Productivity 
Capital  
productivity 
Exports  
per sales 
Profits  
Per sales 
Czech Republic 189 132.8 187.5 3200 
Estonia 150.2 61.8 137.9 300 
Hungary 286.7 . 259.9 333 
Poland 194.4 110 161.8 277 
Slovenia 197 129 152.1 103 
Share of foreign investment enterprises in manufacturing, per cent, 1998 
 Sales Export Profits Investment 
outlays 
Employment 
Czech Republic 32.1 47 92.1 41.6 19.6 
Estonia 28.2 35.2 59.2 32.9 20.8 
Hungary 70 85.9 88.8 78.7 44.9 
Poland 40.6 52.4 66 51 19.2 
Slovenia 24.4 32.9 24.9 24.3 13.1 
Source: Hunya, Gábor, International Competitiveness Impacts of FDI in CEECs,  Paper presented at the 6th E.A.C.E.S 
Conference, Barcelona, 7-9 September 2000, (http://eu-enlargement.org/) and Mickiewicz, Radosevic and Varblane 
(2001) 
 
The share of FDI as a percentage of GDP of central European countries is now similar to 
the EU at around 17%.  Presence of FDI is very strong in Hungary with their shares in sales 
and export of 70% and 86% respectively. The relative importance of FDI in Hungary is 
higher than in Ireland. Also, given the size of its economy and the late surge in inflows of 
FDI foreign companies have managed to secure a strong presence in  sales (40%) and export 
(52%) in Poland. Except in Slovenia, MNCs are generating from 60% to 92% of profits and 
their rates of profitability are from 2.8 to 32 times (!) higher than of domestic firms. This 
shows that the size of economy is not necessarily an indication of MNCs presence in CEE. 
Small economies (Slovenia and Estonia) have comparatively low degrees of FDI presence.  
                                                 
17 A higher capital productivity of domestic firms than foreign in Estonia has to do with sectoral structure of 
FDI and the low share of FDI in industry.  
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In countries with the high share of FDI in sales (Czech R, Hungary, Poland) 
differences in performance between domestic and foreign enterprises are increasing (see 
Hunya, 2000). This in turn increases differences in profitability and then in investment. A 
strong presence of MNCs suggests that the industrial upgrading in these countries is foreign-
led. Increasing differences in productivity between domestic and foreign firms, especially in 
Hungary, indicate the presence of dual economy. All this highlights the need to address the 
issue of interaction between domestic and foreign firms.  
A penetration of FDI in Eastern Europe depends on industry-specific features and 
on the characteristics of the privatisation policies. The main features as described by Hunya 
(1998) are:  
- FDI in Eastern European countries follow worldwide differences in the corporate 
integration of industries 
* Technology intensive electrical machinery and car production are the main target 
* Textiles, clothing, and leather are less internationalized by FDI than other branches; 
* Foreign investors penetrate activities with relatively stable domestic markets, e.g. the food, 
beverages and tobacco industries 
- Branches with low foreign penetration worldwide may have high foreign presence due to 
proximity (e.g. construction material) 
- Privatisation by sales matters for FDI; 
The foreign presence has been so far relatively small in branches with great structural 
difficulties, and oversized capacities, like petrochemicals and steel industry. 
Motives of FDI. The areas of FDI in CEE reflect the interest of foreign investors in 
access to CEE markets (trade and services, partly industry), the low cost sourcing advantages 
of CEE (industry) as well as the areas of biggest investment stakes in non-tradable sectors 
(telecoms; energy). Surveys on FDI by Lankes and Venables (1997), Meyer, (1998) and 
others suggest the predominance of market seeking FDI. Factor cost considerations, as a 
single motivating factor is secondary. Only jointly with attractive markets do lower factor 
costs attract inward FDI (Meyer, 1998). 
The initial investments are those that are domestic market oriented. This explains 
why horizontal types of FDI projects are entering Eastern Europe relatively early (Lankes 
and Venables, 1997). The progress in transformation will make more Eastern Europe hosts 
to vertical FDI bringing them into EU and world production networks.  
Modes of entry. In the early stage of transition foreign investors concentrated on joint 
ventures (J-Vs) with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) where they had minority positions. In 
the second phase, majority FDI was preferred. For example, in Hungary 81% of nominal 
capital in foreign investment enterprises was with a minority share. In 1991, only 34% of 
foreign capital was in companies with a minority foreign share (Hunya, 1996). Joint ventures 
are the least preferred option when compared to FDI. It is likely that the EU enlargement 
will encourage mergers & acquisitions, rather than joint ventures. The reason for this is that 
joint ventures are acceptable only as a device to mitigate risk by allowing easier access to 
local actors, and for acquiring local knowledge (Lankes and Venables, 1997). 
Types of FDI. The type of FDI varies significantly according to the host country's 
progress in transition (Lankes and Venables, 1997). Advanced economies in transition have a 
higher share of export oriented FDI projects, subsidiaries are more integrated into MNCs 
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and are more likely to be wholly owned. Also, countries which are further in transition have 
relatively few projects that have been abandoned or postponed, relatively more export 
supply oriented projects, and relatively more fully foreign owned projects (ibid, 1997). 
However, there is no evidence of a smooth functional relationship between FDI levels and 
transition level & risk (Lankes and Venables, 1997). The penetration of FDI is not a function 
of only country specific institutional features but of a larger set of factors, like industry 
structure, firm strategies and specific FDI policies. 
The effects of FDI. The primary effects of FDI are in increasing the productivity and 
efficiency of acquired companies (Hunya, 1997)(Knell and Hunya, 1999)(Zemplinerova, 
1998). Their relatively higher share of investments and in R&D compared to domestic 
enterprises falls into this picture (Hunya, 1999; Inzelt, 1999; Farkas, 1997).  
The effects of FDI are still localized to acquired or newly erected plants.  
The initial econometric evidence on FDI spillovers at industry level in CEE is negative 
(Knell, 1999)18. The 'enclave syndrome' has already become acute in the Hungarian economy 
and will probably follow in other countries as the size of foreign investments grows. Closer 
integration into the domestic economy will emerge as an important concern for those 
Eastern European governments where FDI have strong presence. However, the indirect 
effects of FDI should be seen within a time dimension. In many cases, the first investment 
phase (assembly activities) has been followed by further integration of local activities, adding 
the elements of procurement and logistics, supply and invoicing, product engineering, 
process and product development.  Yet, this process is not automatic and will depend largely 
on the absorptive and innovative capacities of the host economy. 
 
Non-equity production networks 
 
FDI are an important, but not the only, form of micro-level of integration of Eastern 
Europe into international economy'. Alliances, and among them different forms of 
subcontracting, are very often more important forms of integration than FDI. Given the 
high concentration of FDI in a few CEE countries (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) 
and on several sectors (cars, telecom, food, and trade) the overall impact of FDI on growth, 
with the exception of these three countries, seems slightly exaggerated. However, FDI is 
easier to monitor statistically and identify through business surveys or the business press. 
This also explains the stronger focus on them than on non-equity linkages. Contrary to FDI, 
non-equity links are far less defined; they are more heterogeneous and thus more difficult to 
compare. Also, the lack of systematic data opens up the danger of too hasty generalisation 
on a small sample. 
In continuation, we discuss some of the research on alliances, subcontracting and 
‘outward processing traffic’ (OPT) networks. 
                                                 
18 This is not surprising given the general conclusions of the literature on spillovers which suggest that there is 
not comprehensive evidence on the exact nature of magnitude of these effects. While earlier studies suggest 
that the effects are generally positive the increasing international division of labor within MNCs complicates 
the analysis (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, p. 247). 
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Alliances 
 
The FDI data obscure extra-MNCs or non-equity networks which are probably even 
more important in Eastern Europe than FDI based links. Research by Schmidt (1998), and 
Dalago, et al (1997) considers non-equity links, i.e. subcontracting and alliances. Their 
conclusions are that:  
· Shallow modes of production co-operation, like arms' length transactions and contract 
work, dominate; 
· Eastern European firms are integrated as sub-contractors in vertically structured 
networks conducted by 'Western' firms 
· Low commitment of foreign firms 
· Local firms are involved in labour intensive stages which generate low value-added but 
are also experiencing quality, delivery and co-ordination problems 
Their research gives the impression that the 'East' - 'West' production networks are primarily 
contract manufacturing based at very low value added levels.  
 
In Radosevic (2001c) we reviewed 26 alliances from Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Some of the main findings based on this sample are relevant to this discussion:  
1. As a rule, firms grow either through foreign acquisition or networking (alliances), or 
through generic expansion, but one that relies heavily on networking. Generic expansion as a 
single strategy is rare. 
 2. Types of alliances or co-operative agreements in central Europe if judged on the basis of  
our sample are heterogeneous. Nevertheless, most alliances can be grouped into production 
alliances, or marketing alliances (in the software sector). The most widespread type of 
agreement is subcontracting.  
3. Linkages generated by alliances are of vertical and horizontal types. However, vertical 
alliances were more common in our sample. This is to be expected given the frequent 
presence of subcontracting links. This also suggests that the alliances in central Europe are 
being driven more by unexploited market opportunities and cost differentials than by the 
wish to displace competition. A larger number of horizontal alliances would indicate a 
stronger presence of market share considerations. This seems to be much more of an issue 
in the case of FDI. Sadowski (1997), based on 4 digit SIC data concludes that the majority of 
mergers & acquisitions in central Europe have been horizontal acquisitions. This would 
suggest that in central Europe alliances are more prone to vertical relationships while FDI 
are more prone to horizontal links than alliances.  
4. The comparison of cases suggests that the balance between generic expansion, alliances 
(networks), and mergers & acquisitions as modes of growth, reflects differences in firms' 
abilities to control technology, a ccess to market and finance. If the enterprise is able to exert 
control over two of these three elements, it may ensure growth through alliances by trading 
them for the third, missing or weak element. However, the final outcome does not seem to 
be a direct function of the ability of enterprises to control access to technology, market and 
finance. It is not possible to fully understand alliances by only addressing their internal 
characteristics; how these mesh with their institutional context and with sectoral structural 
features must also be taken into account. The types and dynamics of alliances also reflect the 
political and legal situation of a country (privatisation, attitude towards FDI) as well as 
specific sectoral features in terms of technology, finance and markets. The profile of 
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alliances is shaped through the interaction between firm-specific factors and capabilities, and 
sector- and country-specific factors.  
 
Subcontracting 
 
Subcontracting is considered here to be a specific form of alliance. In the simplest 
terms, subcontracting is contracting that partly contributes to the execution of a major 
contract (Nishiguchi, 1994, p3). The firm awarding the contract to a subcontractor is the 
prime contractor, also termed the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), assembler, 
customer, purchaser, top firm, principal employer, or primary manufacturer. Although 
considered in statistics as ordinary trade, this seems currently to be the most important 
channel for technology transfer to Eastern Europe. Subcontracting involves a variety of 
relationships like contract manufacturing; OEM subcontracting; cost- and specialty-based 
subcontracting, etc. This diversity of types of subcontracting makes statistical analysis of this 
type of production network difficult. However, the importance of subcontracting in sectors 
such as metal products, machinery, and car parts in countries like Hungary and the Czech R, 
and its growing weight in most of the Eastern European countries, calls for a better 
understanding of this intra-industry type of trade. Subcontracting relationships enable the 
subcontracted enterprise to concentrate on production engineering, leaving marketing, and a 
proportion of the financial management, to the prime manufacturer. This is why for many 
Eastern European firms it is the only option if they are to survive and grow. 
However, the problems involved in climbing the value-added ladder through 
subcontracting are not trivial. From a sample of 90 Hungarian subcontractors, Szalavetz 
(1997) showed that close cooperation with foreign partners brings considerable productivity 
improvements. In her sample, all processing firms received a transfer of technology or 
equipment and half the firms benefited from investment or working capital finance provided 
by the foreign partner. However, after the initial push the learning process gradually slowed 
and finally stopped completely. Szalavetz (1997, p. 5) points out that "Once the Hungarian 
company had undergone sufficient restructuring to ensure that cooperation can go smoothly, 
foreign partners abandon any further developmental effort". This occurred even in those 
cases where foreign partners had decided to increase their equity in the Hungarian company 
(ibid., p. 53). 
This example illustrates the difficulties involved in deepening production integration 
and points to the discontinuous character of technological integration and the emerging 
structural barriers for Eastern European firms after initial productivity improvements (see 
Radosevic, 1999e, chapter 5).  
 
Outward processing traffic 
 
Outward processing traffic (OPT) is a specific form of subcontracting. OPT takes 
place when the principal firm supplies the host firm with intermediate products for 
processing then returns them to the principal, which then markets the final output. This type 
of trade permits a relatively close relationship between the firms, and allows for quality 
control and detailed instructions to the host firm if necessary.  
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EU imports after OPT from Eastern Europe reached ECU5.74bn in 1994, and 
ECU6.3bn in 1998. (Naujoks and Schmidt, 1994; Pellegrin, 2000). OPT trade is highly 
industry-specific with textile and clothing making half of OPT trade with Eastern Europe 
and followed by electrical machinery. Very low unit value of import after OPT from the 
Eastern Europe indicates that the bulk of this trade is in labour-intensive sectors and is 
based on labour cost differentials, indicating a low level of technological integration (Sdogati, 
1996).   
However, wages are not the only factor that explains the spread of OPT 
subcontracting.  Based on Asian OPT networks, Gereffi (1999) suggests that the 
determinants might be more numerous, and include wage exchange rates, trade policies 
(quotas, preferential tariffs) and social and cultural factors, such as ethnic ties, common 
language, and common historical legacy. Eichengreen and Kohl (1998) show that OPT has 
not promoted the movement into higher value added exports in the case of Visegrad 4 
(Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics) but that a case can be made for it in the 
second tier of CEEC economies (Bulgaria, Romania). Lemoine (1998) concludes that the 
sectors that were the most dependent on OPT (clothing, leather and shoes) ceased to be the 
engine of central European export performance in the EU market in recent years and as they 
have developed their export capacities independent from OPT. He points to the emergence 
of two tier structure of regional cooperation whereby Balkan countries may take an 
increasing share of OPT.  
In contrast, Pellegrin (1999) is much more optimistic regarding the restructuring 
potential of OPT subcontracting. She argues that '(t)here is not evidence of the destruction 
of local export capabilities resulting from the cessation of OPT activities due to wage 
increases. It is rather the opposite trend which is observed: OPT activities go hand in hand 
with the strengthening of trade performance' (p. 11). She also notes that these outcomes are 
mostly due to the relocation activities of German medium sized firms 'which illustrates the 
important role the latter have in bringing about such transformations' (Pellegrin, 1999, p. 
19).  
 
 
3. 4. INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: 
STYLISED FACTS 
 
Patterns of global industrial networks are largely, industry specific. Foreign equity 
investments are in car assembly, mixture of equity and subcontracting in car parts industry, 
subcontracting in clothing, co-operative agreements in software - these are typical sectoral 
modes of entry in Eastern Europe. They do not reflect the regional specificity alone but also 
the technological features of the sectors. Research on international political economy shows 
that 'there are striking variations across sectors in the nature and kind of authority and how 
much it, or they, intervene with the play of market forces. Compared with differences 
between national laws and institutions affecting the economy, the differences are apt to be 
much greater between sectors of the world market economy' (Strange, 1996, p. 187). 
However, as pointed out by Hall (1997) the principal problem is to specify precisely which 
variables in sectoral relationships (firm, national, sectoral, international) have the most 
impact on corporate strategy and economic outcomes.  
In this section we review the main changes in several industrial sectors in Eastern 
Europe. We base this review on summary that has been already undertaken by Radosevic 
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(1999d) based on  Richet and Bourrasa (1998), Bitzer and Hirschhausen (1998), Charpiot-
Michaud (1998), Bitzer (1998), Mueller (1998) and Bitzer (1998b) and also use additional 
analyses by Egorov (2001), Ivanova (2000), Tunzelmann (2000), and Dagayev (2000), 
Dornisch (2000), Tulder (1999). Our review has revealed several essential features of 
industrial transformation from upgrading perspective. These can be considered as very 
tentative stylized facts which reflect the current state of industry transformation in CEE. 
 
Vertical disintegration and changes in patterns of innovation activities 
 
Industrial transformation in CEE has changed not only the organisation of the 
innovation process but very often the entire production network that formed the basis of the 
sector. The main feature of socialist production networks was a deep vertical integration that 
was unsuitable in the new conditions of opened economies. Disintegration of vertical 
production networks and their reorganisation, very often led by foreign enterprises, also 
changed the nature of the innovation process.  
The radical change in the industrial structure of individual sectors led to changes in 
supply and demand and to a complete change in the position of enterprises in Eastern 
Europe, which is very much sector-specific. For example, Eastern European telecom 
equipment producers have developed from being producers of outdated switching 
equipment to becoming dependent subsidiaries localising state-of-the-art technologies 
(Mueller, 1999). Computer producers had to completely abandon the idea of producing their 
own mini-computers, and were transformed into PC assemblers (Bitzer, 1998). New 
software firms have become customisers of generic solutions in close co-operation with 
foreign software providers (Bitzer, 1998b). Car complexes of the former socialist period 
have been transformed into networks led by foreign assemblers and reorganised with the 
help of first-tier foreign suppliers (Richet and Bourassa, 1999). Domestic car part producers 
have become subcontractors serving foreign-controlled assemblers (Havas, 1999, 1999b). In 
electronics, central European countries, (Hungary and Czech R) have become connected to 
international electronics production networks through foreign investment (Linden, 1998). 
Hungary has moved the furthest along this path, positioning itself as a major low-cost supply 
base in the region (ibid, p. 27).  
The focus of the technology effort has shifted from previous focus on R&D towards 
intra-firm technological improvements where R&D, especially of the imitative type, has 
become much less prevalent - if, indeed, it still exists at all. This has led to a drastic shrinking 
in the demand for domestic technology but has led to huge improvements in operations 
efficiency, especially in foreign controlled enterprises. 
 
Truncated firm and network integration 
 
In our reinterpretation of the socialist production networks (see 3.1.), we concluded that the 
biggest problem was system integration at product level and process (network) integration at 
enterprise level. In transformation process enterprises had to develop previously 
‘externalised’ functions like finance, marketing, and R&D. However, being simultaneously 
faced with technology and a funding gap, they were able to integrate into the world economy 
only in an incomplete (truncated) way by ‘externalising’ undeveloped functions to foreign 
enterprises. For example, subcontractors implicitly transfer their marketing and R&D 
functions to principals. In outward processing arrangements, they also dislocate financing as 
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foreign partners supply them with needed inputs and raw materials. Telecom equipment 
producers who have been taken over by MNCs practically remain production units with very 
limited marketing, finance, and R&D functions. 
The fact that most critical functions are under the control of foreign enterprises is 
both a strength and weakness in the current stage of industrial transformation in CEE. As 
sectoral studies show, in sectors where technical modernisation was foreign-led, 
restructuring was fastest and productivity improvements were high. In the software sector, 
the link with foreign software enterprises through different forms of international co-
operative agreements (value-added resellers, customisers, system providers, etc) is crucial for 
them to capture the domestic market. In PC assembly, good links with foreign components 
suppliers are essential. In telecommunications equipment, domestic enterprises have become 
an integral part of MNC networks. In the car industry, domestic subcontracting networks 
depend quite heavily on foreign assemblers or first-tier suppliers. In all these cases, because 
of foreign-takeover or close cooperation with foreign firms they have improved production 
efficiency. However, these increases in productivity have been paid by reduced strategic 
autonomy, especially in functions like finance, marketing and R&D that historically have 
never been strong in socialist enterprises, 
 
Obsolescence and re-employment of old S&T capabilities 
Sectoral studies show that the public S&T systems in Eastern Europe did not play an 
important role in the restructuring of sectors and enterprises in CEE. The innovation 
process as organised in the socialist period has ceased to operate in all CEECs. The sources 
of innovation and patterns of technical change have changed in all the sectors that have been 
analysed. As in other market economies, enterprises have become one of the main, if not the 
most important, actors in the innovation process. The role of technology institutes in the 
innovation process has been significantly reduced.  
Old model of innovation processes could not continue in new conditions to which 
the entire context of newly opened economies was not conducive. R&D organisations are 
trying to restructure their links with industry by offering new services while being at the 
same time on public funding. Links with ex-branch institutes have lost their previous content 
and the entire industry R&D sector seems redundant in its function as the main source of 
R&D. New links are indirect, through skilled graduates, professional networks, or direct 
through technological problem-solving activities, and the creation of new technology-based 
firms. 
The devaluation of old technology assets has been different significantly from sector 
to sector. Domestic S&T is often not re-employed in its old organisational form, but 
capabilities embodied in networks of research scientists and engineers have often been 
successfully re-employed in another context. ‘Human capital’ as an economic input has two 
components: specialized skills that can become obsolete, and transferable skills that are 
problem solving. For example, in the software sector we could observe a devaluation of 
specialized skills related to programming in software languages developed in socialist times, 
but not of a transferable skill - how to program. Otherwise, it would be difficult to 
understand numerous cases of new software firms that have sprung up based on old 
electronics institutes.  
However, competencies by themselves are insufficient for restructuring without the 
markets, finance, and management that would put all these factors to work. Hence, an 
understanding of whether the problems in restructuring are merely technology assets or 
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some other factor requires an understanding of factors like markets (demand) and finance in 
a specific sectoral context. 
 
 
Market, technology and finance: factors that shape sectoral patterns of restructuring 
Sectoral studies show that the access to market, to technology and finance are 
important in shaping different outcomes of restructuring in different sectors in Eastern 
Europe. These three factors operate as structural factors in restructuring process. However, 
the emphasis on market, technology and finance does not mean that these factors are the 
only determinants of the restructuring. A variety of other factors operate which may not lead 
to modernization despite favorable structural preconditions. 
In the car industry, Central European producers lacked the knowledge to upgrade 
their product and process engineering, and the financial resources to modernize and develop 
new models; moreover, they had inadequate organisational skills to expand subcontracting 
networks. However, the domestic market and the proximity of the EU market were factors 
that attracted foreign investors. The restructuring of enterprises was achieved mainly with 
foreign capital through FDI. For example, Volkswagen bought ‘Skoda’, Fiat bought FSM, 
Daewoo bought FSO, Renault bought Dacia. This was followed by a wave of acquisitions 
and alliances in the car parts sector. The lack of finance, technical knowledge, and 
restructuring that is involved not only in assembling firms, but also in the entire supply chain 
made it very difficult for domestic enterprises to restructure such networks. In the car 
industry, the lack of finance and technology is being traded for access to domestic and/or 
EU markets. The weakness of domestic producers in technology and the lack of domestic 
finance led governments to surrender control over the sector to strategic foreign investors. 
In Russia, a similar situation has not changed the attitudes of the State, which still tries to 
modernise the sector through domestic control. The result is a much slower pace of change 
and enterprises that are still ‘muddling through’. 
The presence of all three factors - access to markets, technology and finance- can 
help to understand why the Polish Sczcecin shipyard is a case of very successful and fast 
modernisation. Bitzer and von Hirschhausen (1998) demonstrate that the common elements 
of this restructuring are:19 
· access to technology: 
Once generalists, the Polish shipyards sought to become competitive in the low-end 
segments, mainly container ships, general cargo vessels, and tankers. This move towards 
technologically simpler ships helped to ease access to technology. However, despite this 
improvements were needed in computerisation and process automatisation and enhancing 
design capacities.  
· access to markets 
The key operation was winning a contract for a series of 20 container vessels in 1989 (Bitzer 
and von Hirschhausen, 1998,p 102). These enabled the shipyard to organise efficient 
                                                 
19 Naturally, the Polish success story cannot be explained entirely only by these three factors. We should not 
forget that this restructuring was enabled by significant labour shedding of half of labour force as well as a 
series of other complementary events. For detailed account see Johnson, S. , D. Kotchen, and G. W. Loveman 
(1996) Complementarities and the managerial challenges of state enterprise restructuring: evidence from two 
shipyards, Economics of Transition, Vol. 4 (1), 31-42.. However, the point is that three factors -finance, market, 
technology- have operated as structural determinants in addition to a variety of contingent factors.  These other 
factors were essential in failure to restructure another Polish shipyard (Gdansk) despite similar structural 
preconditions. 
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production, cut building times, and reduce costs. Thus, market or effective demand was a 
crucial starting point for domestically led modernization.  
· access to finance 
Solving the issue of outstanding debts and credits was the third essential factor. The 
government took over debts and provided guarantees for credits. Also, the government 
granted financial support of $600m for improving the productivity of shipyards. 
 
In contrast to this, Russian shipyards are much slower in restructuring. In 1995, Russia had 
35 shipyards, 150 suppliers, and a dozen R&D and design institutes. Large capacities are now 
used by 40 per cent, resulting in Russia’s fall from 8th to 20th place in world ship 
production. A few successful examples of enterprise restructuring are linked to either  
 
· a Russian company becoming a supplier in international networks or importing 
technology from it, or 
· a Russian shipyard obtaining finance from a Russian or mainly foreign bank by using the 
ship as collateral. 
In addition, Russian yards are blocked in their restructuring by the institutional framework 
(barter, labour market rigidity, unstable legal conditions), leading to high costs and low 
international competitiveness.  
 
What distinguishes the Russian and Polish cases are not technological capabilities but the 
lack of finance, the lack of restructuring agents or organisations that would implement the 
finance, and the lack of that critical initial large order that would put into motion the process 
of restructuring. This is a kind of ‘catch 22’ situation, as unrestructuring is unlikely to occur 
unless there is a prospect of growing market demand. On the other hand, prospects of large 
orders are dim as long as problems in restructuring are so large and shipyards uncompetitive. 
 
The CEE software markets are small by international standards. Market size is particularly a 
problem for the possible domestic development of standardised software. However, for 
customised software market size is not so important. In the area of customised software, the 
proximity to users and a better understanding of local conditions is more important than 
market size. 
The development of software is a very labour-intensive process, in which capital 
intensities are very low. This reduces financial requirements for business and has allowed 
domestic software firms to operate based on retained earnings. Access to technology is 
enabled through international co-operative agreements. In fact, generic software solutions 
almost always need customisations, which leads to mutual interests and the co-operation of 
software providers and domestic software firms.  
As a result of favourable market, technology, and finance factors, customised 
software segments are dominated by domestic enterprises. They have competitive 
advantages in higher flexibility, a lower break-even point in terms of the number of 
customers, personal contacts, knowledge of the language, mentality, culture, knowledge of 
laws and national procedures, etc. The new CEE software enterprises, the overwhelming 
part of which are greenfield creations, now dominate the market segments for low 
standardised software, adapted software and small-scale custom software projects. 
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However, in standardised software or in large complex applications these advantages 
are lost. Financial requirements increase and technology becomes proprietary, which allows 
foreign companies to invest in accessing domestic markets.  
In some niche segments several CEE companies (Paragraph, GraphiSoft, Recognita, 
etc) have managed to enter foreign markets primarily based on the originality of their 
technical solutions. However, as pointed by Bitzer (1998), a few niche exporters do not 
constitute success for the sector as a whole. 
 
In telecommunications, the technology gap between socialist economies and world state-
of-the-art technology was at its relatively widest when seen across the industry spectrum. 
The second feature of the CEE situation in telecommunication is large financial 
requirements. Access to capital and long-term finance is crucial parameter to help service 
providers meet emerging demand. Domestic markets are the only factor in CEE that could 
be traded against a very unfavourable technology and finance situation. Moreover, in a 
liberalised competitive environment, the way in which access to networks and 
interconnections for competing networks is regulated is crucial. Given huge disadvantages in 
the first two factors, the art of strategy in this sector is using access to markets as a 
bargaining chip. The case of the Hungarian telecom sector and privatisation of the national 
service provider Matav as its key development show that this can be done successfully. It led 
to fast upgrading and to an expansion of network to the benefit of domestic customers. 
In addition, the state had quick access to large privatisation proceeds: $2,600 per line, while 
in western Europe the average price is $1,600 per line. The initial idea was to try to trade 
access to the domestic market for access to telecom equipment technology. However, it 
seems that the technology gap was so big that not much has been achieved in this respect 
(Toth, 1994). 
A similar attempt in Latvia, where the domestic market is very small, ended similarly. Even if 
the government had tried to re-establish the S&T links of domestic R&D organisations with 
foreign suppliers (which it did not), the size of the domestically derived demand for S&T 
links is too small to allow for it. 
Why then was the access to markets not used more effectively as a way to get access to 
technology and finance in a country like Russia with a large domestic market? Mueller (1998) 
points to regulatory problems and to a very low effective demand in Russia. Telephone 
income in Russia is less than $100 per line per year compared to $3,400 in Hungary or 
Poland. As a result, investment to upgrade the network continues is very low (0.3 per cent of 
GNP, or less than $1bn). Growth in most regional Russian companies is difficult to finance 
internally. There is a lack of aggregate demand, which has serious effects on the derived 
demand for equipment and associated S&T links, especially as most of the equipment is 
imported. This is accompanied by difficulties for foreign investors in accessing markets due 
to fairly decentralised systems with large regional differences in infrastructure availability and 
tariffs and the lack of a clear macroeconomic and regulatory strategy. The difficulties to 
access markets led to a lack of FDI, which then leads to a much less derived demand for 
equipment and S&T links. The situation is characterised by a vicious circle, in which 
unregulated market access and low effective demand are coupled with large financing 
requirements and a huge technology gap. For the time being, the issue for Russia is how the 
local equipment manufacturers and services suppliers could access technology and the 
expertise of foreign manufacturers without their significant involvement. This seems 
impossible without regulating access to the market, especially given the lack of finance 
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investment, which is very much tilted towards overlay and backbone networks that rely 
heavily on foreign produce equipment and know-how. 
 
- * - * - * -  
 
 Table 12 summarizes the situation of several industries by outlining the impact of 
finance, technology and market access for the overall pattern of restructuring. The most 
common pattern of restructuring is a foreign-led modernization, especially in central Europe. 
This is due to the large gaps in finance and technology access as well as relatively small home 
markets. However, Russia and other European CIS countries do not conform fully to this 
pattern. The issues of domestic versus foreign control of modernization process come much 
strongly into play in these economies than in the central Europe. 
 
Table 12: Determinants of systems of innovation at sectoral level in CEECs: markets, finance and 
technology 
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Table 12: Determinants of systems of innovation at sectoral level in CEECs: markets, finance and technology 
 
 Car industry Shipbuilding Food processing Software Telecoms  Computers 
Markets (demand) Growing domestic demand 
Proximity to EU markets 
Large scale orders are critical Growing domestic demand 
for differentiated products; 
Problems in accessing 
foreign market 
Growing domestic market; 
 
 
 
Growing domestic market 
but with big differences in 
terms of effective investment 
demand 
Growing domestic 
demand for PCs; 
Weak demand for 
workstations and 
mainframes 
Finance Lacking finance Solving the issues of debts 
and external funding is 
critical; 
Financial restructuring 
required. 
Relatively low finance 
requirements; Possibility to 
raise domestic finance. 
No large finance required for 
customized SW; Finance as a 
problem in complex projects 
and standardized SW  
Large finance requirement Low finance requirements 
in PCs; 
Large finance 
requirements in higher 
segments 
Technology Lacking product engineering 
know-how;  
Weak organisational capabilities 
for restructuring supplier networks 
Easier access to technology 
in low-end segments; 
ICA important for accessing 
technology 
Technology is accessible; 
Integration of different 
technologies requires 
organisational capabilities 
Technology ac cessible 
through ICA; Competitive 
advantages of domestic firms 
in customized SW; 
Technology gap in 
standardized SW  
Huge technology gap in 
telecom equipment 
Accessible technology 
and components in PC 
assembly; Huge 
technology gap in higher 
segments 
 
Overall pattern Lacking finance and product 
engineering gap accompanied by 
small domestic markets leads to 
restructuring by foreign assemblers 
in central Europe 
Given the available external 
funding and easier access to 
technology the restructuring 
process depends on the large 
scale orders - foreign or 
domestic 
Lower finance gaps and 
easier access to technology 
allowed domestic - led 
restructuring which is 
accompanied by foreign-led 
restructuring in differentiated 
products 
Growing domestic market, 
low finance requirements and 
access to technology via 
ICAs enabled a visible 
presence of domestic firms 
in customized SW 
Growing domestic market 
but huge finance and 
technology gap led to a 
strong presence of foreign 
network organisers 
Growing domestic 
market, low finance 
requirements and access 
to components from 
world market enabled a 
visible presence of 
domestic PC assemblers 
 
Note: ICA - international co-operative agreements; SW - software; Source: Based on Richet and Bourrasa (1998), Bitzer and Hirschhausen (1998), Charpiot-Michaud (1998), Bitzer (1998), Mueller (1998) and 
Bitzer (1998b). 
Source: Radosevic, Slavo (1999) 'Transformation of S&T systems into systems of innovation in central and eastern Europe: the emerging patterns of recombination, path-dependency and change', Structural 
Change and Economic Dynamics, Vol. 10, 1999, issue 3-4, pp. 277-320  
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Foreign versus domestic –led modernization 
 
Restructuring and technical modernization depends largely on the main actor in the 
restructuring process and which elements of the process he controls (assets, labour process, 
supply, distribution, technology, or finance). The results of these differences are different 
patterns of modernization. The distinction becomes even more important when we take into 
account that the process of foreign investment privatisation in CEE, as in many other 
countries, is also a highly politicised process. A policy attempt to control it may produce 
costs and benefits that are different in the short and the long term. 
In the CEE car industry, most often the big national car manufacturers were sold 
directly to foreign companies (examples are FSO, Dacia, Skoda, FSM). The dominant 
structure is the joint venture, which is controlled by a western partner through a majority 
share. The foreign investors are re-organizers of supplier networks through audits usually 
performed by the first-tier suppliers. 
The exceptions to this process of foreign-led modernization are Tatra in the Czech 
Republic, Moskvitch, AvtoVAZ, GAZ, and UAZ in Russia. In the car industry, Russia 
followed a different path, with the state still holding majority control over three of the 
biggest car manufacturers. The heads of the Russian car industry fear that they may lose 
control of the industry by letting foreign capital in. Given the finance and technology gaps in 
this sector in Russia, despite large domestic demand, the modernisation is lagging far behind 
Polish and Czech car producers. 
The modernisation process in the Polish shipbuilding industry has so far been 
controlled by domestic actors (banks, managers, the state). Given that the access to 
technology was not the major problem, and that banks and the government were willing to 
support restructuring, as there was a critical mass of foreign orders, the whole process 
remained under domestic control. A similar attempt to domestically control the 
modernisation process in Russia has not been so successful. There are government attempts 
to develop domestically-led modernisation through: yard restructuring and modernisation, 
reorientation of production, creation of holdings that would merge different shipyards, 
strengthening of the supplier networks, improvement of design for civil shipbuilding, and 
tariff protection of domestic producers. The results, for the time being, are very poor. 
Unwillingness to surrender control over the modernisation process has probably slowed the 
restructuring of Russian shipyards. This is especially important in view of the case studies 
that indicate that the co-operation with foreign enterprises is a major determinant of the 
success of enterprises. 
A study by Michaud and von Tunzelmann (1999) suggest that there is three-way a 
segmentation of the food processing sector in Eastern Europe: 
 
· medium to large enterprises, often with a foreign presence, whose level of production 
has significantly improved; 
· medium-sized domestic firms, mostly co-operatives, which produce only for the 
domestic market, with a strategy of expanding the range and quality of products; 
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· small, often private, newly created firms that have difficulties to grow. 
 
Except in agriculture and through privatisation, the state has withdrawn from this sector. 
The dominant actors in the 1990s are no longer the state and co-operative enterprises (as in 
the socialist period) but foreign investors and distributors, and new types of medium-sized 
co-operative and domestic distributors. This would suggest that the modernisation process is 
led by both foreign and domestic enterprises that are increasingly competing. 
 
Trade and FDI openness of the Eastern European economies, combined with the 
opportunity for governments to influence to a different extent the forms and degrees of 
foreign involvement, creates numerous trade-offs and policy dilemmas that have strong 
effects on productivity improvements and technical modernization. In addition, domestic 
institutional or private owners and enterprises are often in conflict over different views on 
the restructuring process - which has strong implications on the pace and type of technical 
modernization. Foreign and domestic-led modernization are analytical distinctions that may 
often be found to be dichotomies but also combinations, where control over different key 
factors is distributed across domestic and foreign actors. Whether modernization is domestic 
or foreign-led depends on which key factors drive technical modernization and who controls 
them.  
Sectoral studies suggest that there are situations in which any attempt to keep 
domestic control will only prolong the modernization process and increase restructuring 
costs. This is clearly the case in the telecom services and equipment sectors, in car assembly, 
in the higher-end segments of the computer industry and, probably, in some segments of the 
food processing industry. Given the need for large-scale restructuring and limited resources, 
technical modernization has been successful in sectors where structural factors enabled 
domestic actors to carry out this process on their own. More often, if these factors were 
unfavorable, governments would surrender control to foreign investors and enterprises. 
Foreign-led modernization has raised the productivity of newly acquired enterprises, 
streamlined them, and ensured their integration into international production networks. 
However, this does not resolve the problem of structural change and growth, and the role of 
government. Surrendering control does not release government of its responsibility for 
growth and industrial upgrading. In the medium and long term, more advanced Eastern 
European economies may face new structural barriers in specific sectors for which 
constraints are imminently domestic and should be addressed by today’s policy. 
 
 
Forthcoming structural barriers 
 
Industry studies show not only the extent of undertaken restructuring or the lack of it but 
have also pointed to emerging structural barriers in the industrial upgrading of individual 
sectors.  
 
Car industry. Richet and Bourrassa (1998) have pointed to the successful restructuring of the 
car industry in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia. In almost all countries of 
Eastern Europe, the turning around and restructuring of plants in the car industry have been 
realised through FDI by big MNCs looking for both new markets and to integrate local 
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plants into their world network. These companies have brought cash but also technology, 
know-how, and management skills. 
 
However, they also point to uncertainty in this first group, which may arise regarding the 
behaviour of the first-tier foreign suppliers and the extent to which they will continue to 
develop sourcing networks in Eastern Europe. This will determine the depth of production 
clusters in the car industry. They point out that small firms in this sector in Eastern Europe 
are isolated and without infrastructural support. There is a need for support in training of 
technicians and engineers, providing technical knowledge to suppliers, most often SMEs. 
The essential issue for Eastern European car industry is enlarging the local sourcing base. 
 
Shipbuilding. The example of Poland, which has emerged as the 5th largest shipbuilding 
country, shows that industrial upgrading can take place once effective demand is coupled 
with finance and technology. However, the current success is in low-end ships with a very 
shallow production cluster. Bitzer and von Hirschhausen (1998) point out that innovation 
policy should aim at strengthening the network integration of domestic shipyards and their 
suppliers’ (p. 111). Also, the shipyards in CEE are moving from highly integrated to non-
integrated shipyards. In order to support this shift, S&T policy should be less sectorally and 
more innovation-oriented. It has to be focused on technology networks and be less sector-
specific as sectors like shipbuilding have been transformed into a bundle of different 
technologies. 
 
Food processing industry. Based on the study on the food industry, we can discern three 
structural barriers for industrial upgrading in this sector in Eastern Europe. 
 
1 Agriculture 
In each country, future developments will be largely determined by restructuring in 
agriculture. It is unlikely that the industry will become internationally competitive on a large 
scale as long as agricultural problems remain unresolved, primarily as regards property rights. 
Restructuring is more or less complete in the downstream sub-sectors to which most of FDI 
was attracted in the first place. The product range has expanded significantly compared to 
the past, and marketing and packaging have improved beyond recognition. FDI have 
generated competition of domestic firms, which are learning and catching up through this 
process. The structural problems are in upstream sectors and serve as an important structural 
constraint to growth.  
2 Technology and marketing infrastructure as a barrier for upgrading 
The second important issue is whether new small enterprises will be able to grow. In sectors 
in which sources of innovation are only partly internal, it is essential to develop industry 
infrastructure (R&D, marketing, collective brands).  
 
3 Links with other industries 
Food processing is no longer a traditional industry, given that it combines several types of 
technologies. Therefore, the long-term growth of the industry will also depend on the 
restructuring of related industries. The industry will have to cultivate links with other 
industries, which are one of the main sources of innovation, as well as links with foreign 
suppliers and producers. 
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Software. A further development of software industry in CEE is hindered by the lack of 
infrastructure that is needed for software development (standardisation procedures, 
telecommunications, patent laws and their enforcement). If CEE enterprises are to develop 
into exporters, this cannot be achieved without improvements in the legal and technical 
infrastructure. 
 
Telecommunications, software and computers. In Hungary, because of the successes of the initial 
round of investments in software and electronics, other companies, such as IBM, Motorola 
and Nokia, are following suit. These are not only investments in local demand but also in 
local competence. The next stage in this process is to link domestic enterprises more closely 
to foreign investments. For the time being, FDI still operate as ‘islands,’ reducing 
opportunities for spillovers and for industry upgrading of domestic enterprises. 
 
Polish PC assemblers started as traders and have since managed to consolidate their 
domestic market position. However, the booming demand for home computers is pushing 
sales of sophisticated and customised PCs. This will require greater diversification and 
flexibility on the part of producers. Also, the real production of equipment is still very rare 
and a computer supplier industry does not exist. In view of the uncertainties - due to fast 
development of the computer sector - current successes may soon be a thing of a past. Their 
currently very narrow production specialisation may be far from sufficient to ensure their 
survival in changed conditions. 
 
Forthcoming structural barriers are those that only advanced economies in astern Europe 
have started to face. The majority of Eastern European economies are still struggling with 
their integration into international production networks. In their case, integration at any 
technological level is a solution for the time being. However, as the cases of some sectors 
suggest, industrial upgrading is a continuous process and today’s specialisations may not be 
sustainable or economically profitable in the medium or long term. The case of the car 
industry, considered the most advanced in terms of restructuring in Eastern Europe because 
it integrated early and successfully, shows the type of emerging problems. These are no 
longer problems of intra-company character for which FDI were a sufficient and necessary 
answer. Any emerging problems may be of a systemic character, for which only FDI may 
not suffice. 
 
 
3.5. NETWORK ORGANIZERS AND INNOVATIVE CLUSTERS IN EASTERN 
EUROPE 
 
In order to understand the transformation of industrial networks in Eastern Europe 
and their realignment with global networks requires also an understanding of who are the 
main potential or actual network organizers. Different - national, sectoral, market and firm - 
determinants of the emerging networks are, by themselves, only a conditional advantage 
which requires network organizers to be turned into a real advantages (Radosevic, 1999b). In 
this section we address two issues. First, who are the potential network organizers that could 
undertake the task of organizing production and technology networks. Second, we discuss 
the potential for regional networks to become a restructuring agent. 
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Network restructuring is strongly dependent on the (non)existence of a network 
organizer. At the core of this is the problem of co-ordination and complexity of production 
networks. As already emphasized this issue is of great relevance in the context of Eastern 
Europe because of the two biggest weaknesses of domestic firms: system integration at 
product level and network integration at firm level (see 3.1.). This has been further given 
importance through the globalization of world economy and expansion of global value 
chains. The prospects for rebuilding the Eastern European economies are not only 
conditioned by (dis)economies in production but also can result from the inability of actors 
in production networks to self-organize due to institutional uncertainty and co-ordination 
failures, which hinder the self-organization of industry. This process results in the emergence 
or non-emergence of network organizers - organizations that act as promoters of trade, 
production and/or innovation linkages. 
In a different context but with similar concerns, this issue has been addressed 
through the notion of lead firms. Rugman (1997) points out that the lead company is at the 
heart of network. 'It … provides … strategic and organizational leadership .. beyond the 
resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie directly under … (its) … management 
control' (ibid, p.182)(my emphasis). The strategy of the lead company thus directly affects 
the competitive position of other network participants. Ernst (1999, p. 15, 16) points out 
that '(t)he lead company derives its strength from its control over critical resources and 
capabilities, and from its capacity to coordinate transactions between different network 
nodes. Both are the sources of its superior capacity for generating economic rents. The lead 
firm heavily determines growth and strategic direction of suppliers'. Similar to our concerns 
regarding the Eastern Europe, Gereffi (1999) points to the key question of who will be the 
main 'organizing agents' in modernizing commodity chains in Mexico due to NAFTA20.  
 
Who is emerging as a network organizer in Eastern Europe? In principle, network 
organizers are any actors with the necessary capability and resources - a user or supplier firm, 
a bank, a holding company or a financial - industrial group, a foreign trade organization, a 
design institute, a foreign firm or, in some cases, even the state or state agency. Limited and 
unsystematic evidence shows that there is a wide diversity of network organizers in CEE. 
Given management, finance and technology gaps in CEE, foreign companies are, for the 
time being, the most active network organizers. However, they are not the only restructuring 
agents, as we will illustrate in continuation. 
 
Foreign multinationals  
Foreign firms in Eastern Europe operate as the most active organizers of supply or 
distribution networks. In countries where foreign investments are relatively large, such as 
Hungary, or in sectors where foreign presence is relatively strong (telecoms, car assembly), 
this opportunity is being fully exploited. For example, foreign companies that shape 
domestic supplier networks now dominate telecom equipment production in Eastern 
Europe. In addition, foreign car producers are transferring their supplier networks into the 
                                                 
20 Gerrefi (1999) defines organizing agent as 'those firms, foreign and domestic that could enhance the 
competitiveness of the apparel commodity chains in Mexico through backward or forward linkages with major 
producers and retailers. (p. 67). The lead firms in manufacture centered and retailer centered networks in the 
North American apparel commodity chains are in a position to play a direct role in upgrading Mexican 
domestic industry, (Gereffi, 1999, p. 68). He predicts that 'sourcing intermediaries will emerge in Mexico to 
perform the same kind 'full package' services that trading companies and integrated manufacturers provided in 
'East' Asia. (ibid., p. 68). 
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region (for example, Fiat, VW, GM, Audi) creating in that way a nucleus of local supply 
networks and potential local systems of innovation. Large MNCs like ABB have managed to 
set up a new supply network which involves almost all Eastern European countries and 
some of their subsidiaries, such as Zamech, Poland, are plugged into the ABB design 
network (Barham and Heimer, 1998). A question for foreign companies is whether Eastern 
Europe provides opportunities for cross-national production links and whether they are able 
to exploit these opportunities.  
For example, Tulder (1998) shows that the shape of international production 
networks in the European car industry largely runs along the lines of four strategic 
groupings: frontrunners (Volkswagen, General Motors, Fiat and Renault), followers (PSA, 
Ford), peripheral (Suzuki, Daewoo) and (voluntary) lock out (BMW, Toyota, Nissan, 
Daimler Benz) networks. Tulder and Ruigrok (1998) conclusion is that '(e)ach group of firms 
share different strategic intentions for the region. Followers and lockout networks largely see 
the region as a still limited market. Peripheral firms primarily use the region as an entry into 
the Western-European market. Frontrunner firms adopted the most sophisticated (and also 
most difficult to manage) strategy: They aim at the region as a production site for cheap re-
imports back into the home base, they see it as a source for lower-end world cars and 
components, and they see the region as a market.' (Tulder and Ruigrok 1998, p.46). This 
points to the role of individual firms in shaping patterns of industrial networks. Industrial 
networks, which individual firms are part of, have a significant impact on the nature of 
success of the strategies that firms pursue. Equally, individual firms are able to shape the 
patterns of adjustment to a large number of firms with whom they are in cooperation or 
competition.  
In 2.1., we pointed that the export patterns from the region are diverse. This mirrors 
the diversity of the models of operations of foreign firms in CEE, which are also diverse. As 
industry studies show, they range from operations where Eastern Europe functions as a low 
cost base to those where it operates largely as a complementary production base. In the 
upper range of business models we find establishment of new production models as in the 
case of VW/Skoda (Dorr and Kessel, 1997)(Brezinski and Fluchter, 1998), or integrated 
affiliates like in the case of GE/Tungsram and ABB(Barham and Heimer, 1998). However, 
the most widespread seems to be the position where CEE enterprises operate as extended 
workbenches or localizers (Lankes and Venables, 1997).  
The extent to which foreign firms operate in Eastern Europe as network organizers 
of their upstream or downstream chains is still unknown. More detailed case studies would 
be needed to draw firm conclusions. The impression from sparse studies is that foreign firms 
have not yet progressed far in reorganizing their supply chains (see Box 1). Some of the first 
tier suppliers have accompanied their assemblers, especially in car industry. However, 
whether subcontracting chains will deepen will largely also depend on the capability of host 
economies to work jointly with foreign companies. This issue has been recognized as of 
policy relevance only recently in some central European economies, in particular Hungary 
and Czech Republic. 
 
Box 1: TESCO (UK): Building supply driven chain in central Europe? 
Retailing market in central Europe has been an early target of large foreign retailers. These 
multinationals have changed traditional shopping customs by introducing a western shopping culture 
through product variety and modern store formats. Of these, Tesco is the UK retailer with distinctive 
advantages that it carries from the UK retail market to the central European markets. It is the 
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Britain’s biggest retailer in terms of market share (15.2%) and the world ’s biggest e-grocer with 
annual sales of £125m. Within its strategy of globalization Tesco quickly expanded into central 
Europe where it could see big market potential (see table). 
 Number of 
Stores 
Year of entry 
Hungary 39 1994 
Poland 34 1995 
Czech R. 10 1996 
Slovakia 8 1996 
Central Europe 91  
Thailand 17 1997 
Korea, R 2 1996 
Taiwan 0 2001 
Ireland 75  
UK 659  
Total 844  
As part of its strategy Tesco has started not only distribution but also purchase of its own-branded 
products from central Europe. It called on some of its existing own-label suppliers to set up in 
central Europe to supply their new hypermarkets. The aim is to establish a local network of suppliers 
in order to reduce the costs of sourcing products from the UK. One of its suppliers, HL Food, has 
opened premises in Poland and others suppliers have plans to follow that strategy. By being at the 
core position in the distribution chain in central Europe Tesco has opportunity to reorganise and 
improve supply chains, in particular relationships with agricultural producers. By closely monitoring 
suppliers it may help them to improve their technical, marketing and hygiene standards. Whether it 
will be successful in this strategy remains to be seen. 
Source: Yoruk, D. E. and S. Radosevic (2001) International Expansion and Buyer-Driven Commodity 
Chain: The Case of Tesco, University College London – School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 
Working Paper. 
 
 
  
Domestic enterprises and business groups  
A possible network organiser in Eastern Europe can be any organisation with 
network organisational capabilities and resources. Large domestic companies that dominate 
national sectors are the most likely to play such role.  For example, the behaviour of 'Skoda' -  
Plzen, or the Polish corporation, 'Elektrim', basically shapes sectoral systems of innovation 
in power equipment and related industries in these countries. The impact of the behavior of 
'Gazprom', the Russian gas producer, that is organized as a single joint-stock company and 
represents 10% of Russian GDP, reaches beyond the Russian gas sector into several related 
industries (Krykov and More, 1996). 
Cases of Hungarian electronic holding company Videoton and Polish conglomerate 
Elektrim represent cases of strong and weak restructuring agents (see Box 2 and 3). In 
addition, both cases show that Eastern European enterprises can grow only if they learn to 
cooperate through alliances, subcontracting and equity relationships. A scope for generic 
expansion is much reduced when compared to opportunities for growth based on 
networking through alliances. 
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Box 2: Elektrim: from potential network organizer to focused company 
Elektrim is one of seven Polish ex-foreign trade organisations (FTOs) that in the 
transition period transformed themselves into conglomerates. Out of more than 40 FTOs in 
1989, around a dozen have managed to survive and grow in the market context.  
During the 1990s the management of Elektrim tried to model itself along the lines of 
companies like Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Mitsui, Japanese industrial groups led by trading 
companies (former zaibatsu). However, the business history of Elektrim suggests that it has 
not been able to operate as a network organiser or the core of a new industrial group where 
individual diversified firms would find significant advantages in exploiting intra-group 
externalities in cheaper finance, secure demand and supply, etc. In many respects the frenzy 
of acquisitions from the early-1990s suggest that Elektrim behaved like the CEE tycoons 
who put the opportunity to ‘build empires’ over the profitability of individual operations or 
over exploitation of synergies among intra-group firms. While this assessment may have 
been correct for the very early years of transition, Elektrim has started to develop a more 
coherent group profile in the late 1990s. Instead of building diversified business group in 
1999 the company entered a new (third) stage, which can be described as consolidation, and 
focusing. Its new Chief Executive Officer set the focus for Elektrim on three core business: 
telecommunications, power generating equipment and cables, with strong expansion in 
telecommunications as a starting point. This included take-overs of local operators and 
acquisitions of shares in telecom companies.  This new strategy suggests that the days of 
frenzied acquisitions are now over and that Elektrim, like other ex-FTOs, faces 
consolidation. As part of this shift it is currently trying to dispose of 80 of its non-core 
subsidiaries. However, with the focus towards telecom Elektrim’s growth is highly 
dependent on how good it is at raising sufficient amounts of cash to invest in order to 
exploit newly acquired operating licences in mobile and fixed telephony. Analysts question 
Elektrim’s ability to finance its long list of projects, mainly those in telecoms and the power 
industry. The difficulties that Elektrim has to overcome to grow further independently have 
been confirmed through its conflicts with Deutsche Telecom and alliance with Vivendi as 
well as in new partnerships which it has to enter into if is to play any important role in the 
Internet area. Also, its growth in energy and cables is dependent on building similar 
partnerships in these areas as well. 
Source: Radosevic, S. and Yoruk, D. E. (2001) The Issues of Enterprise Growth in 
Transition and Post-Transition Period: The Case of Polish ‘Elektrim’, University College 
London – School of Slavonic and East European Studies, Working Paper, mimeo 
 
 
Box 3: Videoton: domestic network organizer in contract manufacturing 
Videoton is ex-socialist electronics conglomerate that has become an important, if 
not the most important, contract manufacturer in electronics in Eastern Europe. The main 
change introduced by new management was to abandon the manufacture of complex end 
product and to become subcontractor in several areas, especially in electronic assembly.  
The important factor that played the role in the emergence and than growth of 
Videoton is that the company was not broken up before privatisation. Videoton continued 
to operate as a holding that enabled it to develop the strategy based on building diverse 
production activities and synergies among them. As a part of holding the exposure of 
individual companies to exogenous circumstances is controlled by parent company.  
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During the socialism Videoton had developed imitative capabilities in product design and 
product engineering which was sufficient for being a product leader within COMECON 
market. The retreat into contract manufacturing led to abandonment of R&D. Videoton lost 
most of its R&D workforce in the period around 1989.  From old products Videoton 
continued to produce loudspeaker systems, colour TVs and defence communication 
systems. Most of these products Videoton is selling under other companies name.  
In 1993, the 26 Videoton companies have been reorganised into 18 profit centres, 
concentrating on four major areas of business: consumer electronics; subcontracting; 
defence manufacturing, and domestic and international sales and services. The Holding 
Company manages the profit centres until they become viable entities, then spins them off 
into independent companies. The long-term goal is for the holding company to act only as a 
financial controlling group, with independent companies responsible for their own 
management. The holding group will continue to co-ordinate the activities of companies in 
the conglomerate to seek out new markets and consolidate manufacturing processes. 
Industrial parks are integral part of Videoton’ strategy. Three of ten Videoton’s 
locations in Hungary have status of industrial parks awarded by the state. Their successful 
integration into Videoton’s strategy is based on synergies among Videoton units as well as 
between them and foreign operations.  
Videoton case shows that subcontracting is a very good way to get access to market, 
technology and finance. Its strategic challenge is how to get out of subcontracting trap that 
creates dependence and low value added. So far, Videoton has been very successful in 
building strategy for a long-term future. 
Source: Radosevic, S. and Yoruk, D. E. (2001b) Videoton: The Growth Of Enterprise Through 
Entrepreneurship And Network Alignment, University College London – School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies, Working Paper, mimeo 
 
Other organizers  
State agencies can in some circumstances operate as successful restructuring agents (see 
Box 4). Also, in several instances in Russia R&D institutes could operate as restructuring 
nodes of sectoral network. For example, Alange et al (1995) show in the case of the machine 
tools cluster in St. Petersbourg, that design institute could acts as a system integrator, by 
fulfilling the engineering function which is still undeveloped in enterprises, compensates for 
the poor capabilities of the engineering function of enterprises, and function as a bridge 
between academia and industry. Also, Vorobjev (1995), in the case of the Russian aviation 
industry, argues that this network is led by a few leading design institutes. 
 
Box 4: ARIA (Moldova): State agency as a restructuring agent 
Simply applying tight bankruptcy procedure without opportunity to initiate restructuring has 
introduced in many Eastern European economies a bias against liquidation and delay. This 
has been recognized some time ago by analysts but has not been addressed as a  policy issue 
(see van Wijnbergeben, 1993). The ARIA model of restructuring has succeeded in 
overcoming this problem by bringing together bankruptcy and liquidation (destruction) and 
entrepreneurship (creation), rather than handling them as two disconnected social processes.  
ARIA, the Moldovan Agency for Restructuring and Enterprise Assistance 
ARIA was created in 1995 as a nonprofit NGO funded by donors and the government. It 
was to serve alongside bankruptcy processes as a mechanism to use enterprise arrears as 
leverage to force out-of-court or in-court restructuring or liquidation. ARIA was also 
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intended to support managers and entrepreneurs through consulting services, technical 
assistance, and training; to assist enterprises with debt resolution and facilitate changes in 
ownership and management; and to help build new enterprises.  
 
Today ARIA provides two main types of enterprise support. Enterprise restructuring 
services are financed under the first World Bank private sector development project (with 
donor cofinancing). And a range of supplemental business promotion, consulting, and 
training services are financed by other donors and the second World Bank private sector 
development project (see figure below). About 25 percent of ARIA’s expenditures are 
recovered from the enterprises it assists, mostly for its supplemental services. 
A key element in ARIA’s approach is the industrial park strategy: breaking up old enterprises 
to rehabilitate industrial potential, recombine assets to improve their productivity in new 
enterprises, and match human resources and assets. ARIA mobilizes local resources and 
attracts small private investors when there is no possibility of attracting a strategic investor. 
New enterprises and jobs are created without any investment by the state. Historic debts of 
former loss-makers are repaid or rescheduled in the course of industrial park development. 
Firms assisted by ARIA outperformed all other firms in productivity, sales growth, exports, 
and tax payments (and by implication, financial discipline). In addition, ARIA-assisted firms 
were better able to find new markets, change suppliers and customers, attract foreign 
investment, and initiate changes in management. The data generally confirm the benefits of 
ARIA’s assistance to Moldovan enterprises: 
 
· ARIA assistance is associated with a 30 percent increase in the rate of productivity 
growth.  
· ARIA firms’ sales per employee rose 16 percent during 1995–99, while those of non-
ARIA firms fell by 13 percent, measured in real terms.  
· Exports per employee fell 78 percent for non-ARIA firms but 30 percent for ARIA 
firms.  
· Restructured ARIA enterprises pay more taxes than other enterprises and have attracted 
about $40 million in new foreign investment commitments.21 
ARIA has developed a unique and socially accepted approach to the economic and political 
challenge of restructuring Soviet-style enterprises. ARIA works with existing capital and 
human resources to “bootstrap” and restructure enterprises and create new businesses, thus 
reducing the overall loss of employment that usually accompanies restructuring. Although 
ARIA does not have formal authority to co-opt or replace management to enable 
restructuring, its reputation authority often—but not always—makes this feasible. The 
reputational authority derives from ARIA’s successful track record and its unique position as 
a nongovernmental agency with a strong and committed leadership and dedicated and skilled 
staff. ARIA has succeeded by deploying an effective institutional model and an innovative 
and carefully executed approach to strategic industrial restructuring. ARIA also demonstrates 
that publicly supported intervention at the enterprise level can be successful and may even 
be necessary in some circumstances to break a downward spiral of enterprise and economic 
decline. 
Source: World Bank, 20001, Liquidating Moldova’s Old Enterprises and Creating New Ones, 
Private and Financial Sectors Development sector Unit, January 26, Washington, mimeo   
                                                 
21 All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. 
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Local networks 
A long-term growth of CEE economies will largely depend on whether the regions 
in these economies will become loci of innovation activities. For the time being there are 
only isolated cases of regional dynamics and relative success, most of which are confined to 
localities rather than the whole region.  
The last 10 years have seen localized activities to foster regional innovation.  
Innovation centers, S&T parks, free economic zones, incubators, regional development 
agencies, and support to SMEs have been established in all Eastern European countries in at 
least a few places. Most of these institutions have been set up with international assistance. 
However, these initiatives suffer several weaknesses like short-term funding, their supply-
push nature, and an emphasis on organizations rather than functions and programs. Policy 
has not yet been able to include into the regional innovation process other potential network 
organizers like foreign firms, large domestic firms in cooperation with small firms or 
networks of small firms. 
The Eastern Europe entered the post-socialist period with very weak layer of 
regional institutions and competencies for independent decision making at regional level. 
These involved the formation of Regional Development Agencies as the mechanism to bring 
into partnership the range of other local and external agents. The development agency acts 
as a 'broker' or catalyst for a wider network of relations between local agents and 
government at central and at local level. While being important agents of change in the long 
term, the weaknesses of the enterprises and other organizations in the region undermine the 
role and potential of agencies for inter-regional networking. 
 
The establishment of institutions for regional innovation support requires long-term 
funding and commitment. The 1-3 year time span of project cycles within which most of 
these initiatives in Eastern Europe are funded cannot ensure long-term viability of supported 
organizations. Once they are left on their own they are too weak to survive or to retain their 
initial strategic objectives. When faced with a cut in subsidies and with weak local demand 
they are forced to abandon their original networking functions. Organisations, which are 
basically supply driven, need much longer policy commitment to develop and embody 
themselves within the local economy. 
 
These types of institutional transfer most often do not represent the response of the 
locality to their problems. They are no more than a transfer of institutions which does not 
resolve the main constraint – a lack of collective action, which is implicit in institutions like 
innovation centres. In bringing new institutions into an environment with scarce resources 
and organisations with their own vested interests and agendas it is not surprising that the 
innovation centres or S&T parks do not operate as sources of growth and network 
organizers in the regional context.  Whether new organisations are successful or not in the 
end does depend so much on their own efforts as on whether local networks are status quo or 
pro change. 
 
The emphasis is on the new institutions rather than on functions. This is partly due to the 
logic of international technical assistance where sponsors prefer to be in full control during 
the project by establishing ‘greenfield’ institutions rather than to deal with the messy and 
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complicated world of existing institutions.  Networking or bridging functions are supported 
through new stand-alone organisations, like innovation centers, rather than as a part of the 
existing enterprises, universities, RTD organisations, and industrial associations (see Box 5). 
What is needed is support for the bridging or networking functions not as a stand-alone 
function but more as a complementary function of RTD institutions or enterprises..  
 
Box 5: Russia: Attempts to nurture innovation at a local level 
In the early 1990s, the regional component of Russian S&T and innovation policy has 
started to develop by giving support to the establishment of technoparks. In 1998, there 
were 42 technoparks and 11 innovation-technology centres in Russian regions. In 1993, for 
the first time, the federal government started to co-fund regionally oriented programs (0.3% 
of federal R&D budget). Partly because of the government resolution No. 360/1995, regions 
have been encouraged to form their own institutions in the area of regional S&T and 
innovation policy. In 1997, in the subjects of the Russian Federation, there were 15 
Scientific-Coordination Councils, and 10 Scientific and Scientific-Coordinative Centres. 
 
These policy initiatives have been accompanied by introduction of diverse mechanisms of 
support, including innovation centers. In continuation, we briefly explain the reasons for 
failure of such initiatives. The analysis of demand for innovation services in Russia shows 
that: (1) the innovation services segment of the market is very limited and the market is 
mainly confined on business services, (2) there are signs of a gradual shift from services 
induced primarily by problems in the business environment (accounting and tax services) 
towards market and investment related services.  On the other hand, innovation centres in 
Russia are expected to operate as poles of regional growth by assisting the growth of small 
firms, and, when set up on premises of large enterprises, as sources of their restructuring. 
TACIS-supported innovation centres show the first steps that have been taken in this 
direction, as well as the variety of problems, which hinder this realization.  
 
First, founders of innovation centres usually overload innovation centers with conflicting 
objectives. The first is to support technology based regional firms by assisting them as public 
agencies for the support of regional innovation activities. The second is to be self-financed 
in short- or medium-term and to act as any other commercial organisations which has to 
satisfy only the current real demand. The duality of this position for all involved is obvious. 
For local administration, this requires it to be a guardian, promoter and co-funder but not to 
interfere into daily activities of innovation center. For employees of innovation centres, this 
means building an autonomous commercial organisation that has to survive on shallow and 
cash- stripped markets, and thus has to go wherever the demand is. However, it has as at the 
same time to fulfil its public role, as assigned by the founders. It is not surprise that in the 
cases where the understanding of the objectives was shared by all, the work of the 
innovation centre is more successful.  
 
Second, if we take into account the current structure of demand for consultancy services in 
Russia, it is clear that the great bulk of demand is for general business consultancy activities. 
It is difficult to build an innovation centre focused on support of new technology based 
firms that also has to survive in the market for ‘first aid’ consultancy services. 
 
 55
The rationale for supporting innovation centres is the role that they can play in promoting 
innovation in the region. For the time being they are contributing to this aim like any other 
consultancy company; by offering a set of specified services of use to small firms. The 
demand for their services is largely dependent on the existence of favourable public sources 
of finance for small firms where innovation centres are assisting them in the application 
process. They are not the only intermediaries in this business.  
 
The public functions of innovation centres may be significantly strengthened if they are 
made to be able to tap into both the current demand and the latent potential for consulting 
services. The support for these activities should be either based on a specified program of 
activities or as subsidised services.  
Source: Radosevic and Dranev (1999). 
 
 
 
4. STATE AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL 
UPGRADING 
 
The role of the state and state policy capability has been very much-neglected 
dimension of post-socialist transformation throughout the most of the 1990s. This may be 
understandable given the overall political drive towards minimalist state and disastrous 
experience with the Communist State. It is only recently that it has become clear that much 
of differences among East European countries, including the effectiveness of transition 
policies, have to do with the quality of State governance (EBRD, 1999).  
An important lesson from the last 10 years is that even when State tried to dissociate itself 
from interference into processes like privatization and restructuring it was unable to do so. 
In Czech Republic, where State tried to insulate itself from privatization it eventually had to 
aid the resolution of existing intra-network conflicts over asset control and restructuring 
strategies. As Hayri and McDermot (1999) point out: that  ‘efforts by the Czech government 
to maintain autonomy via state-imposed restructuring and pure ownership solutions only 
encouraged stalemate’ (p. 154). Government had to accept the role of mediator and partner 
to the banks and networks of producers. In Hungary, an increase of the formal 
independence and differentiation of enterprises from state agencies has often been 
counterbalanced by continued informal interdependence with state bodies and banks 
(Whitely and Czaban, 1998). EBRD (1999) survey on state governance concludes that ‘The 
state no longer uses plans and commands to direct firms, but the links between the state and 
firms remain close’ (..) the process of ‘depoliticising’ enterprises remain very incomplete in 
all transition economies. The reform process has been associated with a change in the form 
of state intervention, but not necessarily with a reduction in the overall level of intervention 
or in the informal tax imposed on firms in the form of bribes and times spend dealing with 
government officials.(p. 128,129) 
 
In this section, we analyze how various policies of Eastern European states have affected 
modernization of their industrial systems. We review the effects of transition policies on 
knowledge based activities, and then evaluate current activities within industrial, S&T and 
innovation policies. However, before that we discuss what are the major factors that 
determine the context within which different policies are evaluated. 
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 Central and East European states, globalisation and industrial upgrading 
 
Eastern Europe has become increasingly integrated into the world economy at a time when 
the scope for domestic policies has been drastically reduced (Rodrik, 2000). Unlike east 
Asian economies from the 1960s to 1980s, which had to abide by few international 
constraints and pay few of the costs of integration into world economy, Eastern European 
economies have to pay high costs in terms of institutional adjustment, trade and finance 
openness. In addition, this transformation takes place at a time when they have accumulated 
huge restructuring problems, which would require much larger scope for domestic policy 
than it is possible today. They are squeezed between macroeconomic and political 
requirements for lean governments and the need for greater provision of social insurance, 
which comes from their increased trade integration. As the benefits of openness are 
uncertain and the costs of institutional adjustment to WTO and EU regimes are high 
Eastern European economies are seeking ways to reduce costs of exposure and risk involved 
through EU integration. It than comes as not surprise that the majority of Eastern European 
economies see the only solution in the acceleration of accession to the EU. Consequently, 
very often, accession requirements operate as a substitute for any industrial or other strategy.  
As State leverage now tends to be towards framework conditions, they have lost much of 
their leverage over MNCs. How to ensure favorable framework conditions but at the same 
time develop a new networking role in aligning different networks is a challenge for Eastern 
European governments. They have to learn how to align demand side (global) networks with 
supply side (national and regional) networks in globalised environment. In a way, they, as 
most of the other economies, have to find out how to pursue a controlled globalisation of 
their economies. To what degree can they effectively benefit from the proliferation of 
network linkages with foreign companies and manage this process22? 
As Evans (1995) point out the new internationalisation places new demands on the state yet 
leaves it less politically able to pursue transformative ends.  In particular, in Eastern Europe 
where restructuring needs are vast the problem of state involvement in supporting industrial 
upgrading but in cooperation with foreign capital remains a big challenge. It is very likely 
that the outcomes will be influenced by the quality of state governance, which differ 
significantly across CEE. 
The state governance has affected the modernization of the CEE industrial systems 
(EBRD, 1999). The analysis shows that the type of policy per se was secondary if not 
considered in relation to the quality of State governance. Good governance brought less 
State capture. In addition, similar transition policies have different effects which depended 
on the quality of State governance (EBRD, 1999). The CEE situation has basically 
confirmed Evans (1993) proposition that ‘the obstacles to an effective role for the state are 
not so much rooted in the propensity of the state to intervene as in the difficulty of 
constructing strategies of involvement commensurate with limited capacity to intervene’. 
While mainstream economists on transition have been emphasizing the dangers of 
government failures the real issues is how to design policies in conditions of simultaneous 
government failure and market failure. It seems that the only feasible policies in many CEE 
countries are those with the low costs that take into account bad State governance or weak 
policy capability. Yet, State governance does not operate in isolation from 'non-market 
                                                 
22 For discussion of these issues in the case of Hungary see Bailey (1995). 
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mechanisms of market articulation' (associations, forums, information sharing mechanisms, 
government organized contests).. This ‘civil business society’ sphere is still undeveloped in 
Eastern Europe. Its development would shift a significant part of the burden of policy 
formulation, coordination and implementation from the State (see Radosevic, 1995, 1997).  
 In conclusion, Eastern European states are faced with the challenge of how to 
support industrial upgrading which today can be undertaken only in cooperation with 
foreign companies and in a liberalised economic environment. This is a challenge, which 
they share with other economies but what distinguish them is the sheer task of it. Last 10 
years have shown that the policy outcomes and assessment of policy actions in Eastern 
Europe cannot be undertaken without taking into account the quality of State governance 
and how developed are mechanisms for articulation of interests of business and consumers. 
  
Transition policies and industrial upgrading23 
 
It is hardly surprising that the dominant policies in the Eastern Europe so far have 
been transition policies. By this, we mean policies dealing with privatisation, price and 
foreign trade liberalisation, reforms of the banking and legal systems, and enterprise 
restructuring. Their aim has been to achieve institutional convergence towards the system of 
the market economy. It is beyond doubt that policies such as price and foreign trade 
liberalisation are essential to the transformation process. They ensure freedom of action for 
enterprises, and the freedom to pursue profitable opportunities, and thus may be considered 
necessary conditions for innovation and for building a knowledge-based economy. But 
clearly they do not suffice. For example, price and foreign trade liberalisation are necessary 
rather than sufficient conditions for restructuring.  
Transition policies are geared to macroeconomic stabilisation and institutional 
convergence towards the market economy rather than towards growth and structural change. 
In the present context, we must, then, start from a position of scepticism as to how 
conducive transition policies have been to structural change towards innovation and a 
knowledge-based economy. Specifically, the rationale that forms the basis of transition 
policies and the rationale for policies to support learning are not the same. While the former 
are based on the market failure rationale, policies for learning have to be more broadly 
based, because of the specific features of knowledge as a ‘commodity’ with strong public 
good and network elements, in the context of pervasive strategic uncertainties in CEE. 
The medium- and long-term growth of the CEE countries will depend on their structural 
shift towards a knowledge-based economy and the embodiment of innovation in all 
industrial sectors. More specifically, this shift will depend on: 
 
· The diversity of enterprise types . Socialism was characterised by a lack of enterprise types, not 
only in terms of ownership but also in terms of size, technological functions, and 
knowledge base. A libera lised economy provides the opportunity to create a variety of 
enterprise types, which is beneficial in terms of structural change and innovation. 
· The intensity of knowledge exchange and diffusion among enterprises. Enterprises seldom operate 
as isolated units relying only on their own knowledge and innovation activities. Even 
when they do not have links in the innovation process, they exchange production know-
how through informal networks either in a local context or with foreign partners. 
                                                 
23 A part of this section draws on Dyker and Radosevic (2000). 
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· The role of public institutions in fostering intra-organisational and inter-firm learning. Enterprises 
rely on a wide variety of infrastructural institutions and public networks that reduce 
strategic uncertainties through R&D programmes and academy-industry consortia, or 
reduce costs of specific activities like export promotion or innovation. 
 
The experience of CEE suggests very weak synergy between transition policies in the 
narrow, macro-economic sense and the required shift towards an economy based on 
innovation and knowledge. Of all the main transition policies, privatisation has the biggest 
direct implications for the innovation and knowledge base of the countries concerned. The 
effects of privatisation programmes are manifold, and restructuring and enterprise growth 
do not always top the list. The basic criterion for assessing privatisation policies from an 
innovation and knowledge perspective is the extent to which they allow for the diversity of 
enterprise forms, sizes, and strategies, all of which is essential for knowledge diffusion and 
generation. Privatisation also strongly influences the pattern of development of inter-firm 
networks and the way in which public policy mediates the process of economic 
development. Privatisation is an indispensable condition for restructuring, but it does not 
restructure by itself. If pursued as the main objective through rapid, mass sell-offs, it may 
even inhibit restructuring (cf. the experience of the Czech Republic and Russia). In 
particular, the privatisation of banks is not sufficient to ensure that capital will be directed 
towards exports and industry, rather than towards real estate, securities, and imports. 
Improved corporate governance at the firm level and the break-up of large enterprises are 
seen as the ultimate objectives of enterprise restructuring. However, breaking up large 
enterprises does not necessarily lead to positive outcomes at branch level.. 
The East German experience shows that a policy of breaking up large enterprises can 
have a serious negative effect on demand for R&D.  However, the core of the argument 
here is not about large enterprises as such, but rather about the lack of diversity of enterprise 
forms, that privatization may generate. A shortage of dynamic small firms is just as serious 
an obstacle to innovation dynamics and knowledge diffusion as a shortage of big firms, as is 
palpably obvious from the case of Russia. Furthermore, the number of small firms in a given 
economy is in itself no guarantee that diversity of role and strategy will develop among small 
firms. Too many small firms with low levels of technological competency, operating within 
the framework of a semi-formal economy, indicate a dual economy rather than a diverse one. 
The same point can be made in relation to corporate governance. Where rapid privatisation 
has resulted largely in nomenklatura privatisation, most notably in Russia, the ‘new’ owners 
tend to be generally uninterested in innovation; more insidiously, they tend as a group to 
operate in terms of the rules of thumb and mores of the old Soviet-type economy. There can 
be little doubt that this is one of the main elements in the structural crisis that hit the 
Russian economy in mid-1998 (see Dyker, 2000).  
In the light of these problems, there is a clear need for better integration of structural 
and transition policies, to induce economic growth and to initiate structural change. 
However, this is easier said than done, as the (in) compatibility of objectives and instruments 
between the two is strong. For example, emphasis on good corporate governance clashes 
with the objective to ensure presence of large firms as the major generators of demand for 
R&D. A need to maintain macroeconomic balances clashes with the need to reduce real 
interest rates to a level which would ensure long-term investment. A need to ensure 
temporary monopoly rents to domestic producers’ clashes with the need to ensure fair 
competition and trade openness. Equally, policy of market reserve for foreign telecom 
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operators clashes with the competition policy. Obviously, the issue is how to ensure a policy 
mix, which would balance disparate long- and short-term, transition and growth objectives. 
 Unfortunately, we cannot be much specific about the appropriate policy mixes for 
CEE economies. There is very little that can be said without going into specificity of an 
individual country. The policy mix will greatly depend on how far is country in 
transformation process. The further the economy is in systemic reform its problems are 
more likely to be problems of ‘real’ economy, i.e. the issues of structural change in industry 
and technology. In this case, policy mix will have to take into account the issues of structural 
adjustment towards knowledge based economy and how to cooperate with foreign 
companies towards industrial upgrading. Problems of economies, which are still in the 
transition stage, like Russia, Ukraine, Romania, etc.,  is mainly how to ensure level playing 
field and remove sector specific market distortions. A study by McKinsey (1999) on Russian 
industry provides quite extensive and revealing evidence on this. The conclusion of the study 
is that the main barriers to economic growth in Russia are unequal conditions of competition 
that tends to be industry-specific and thus have to be removed on a sector by sector basis. 
These are unequal levels of taxation, non-equal allocation of government procurement and 
land, non-equal level of energy payments, unequal enforcement of custom tariffs, and threat 
of red tape. Contrary to conventional thinking corporate governance, high costs of capital, 
budget deficit, drops in demand, or labor mobility are shown to be secondary factor for the 
low productivity in Russian industry. The sector level market distortions result primarily 
from bad federal or regional state governance. The sector specific distortions lead to 
continued, large governmental financial transfers to the enterprises, especially the larger ones 
which is the major reason for the unevenness and slower pace of adjustment by Russian 
enterprises (Fan and Schaffer, 1994).  
 In economies that have better state governance and less sector specific market 
distortions, the policy mix should be much more geared towards industrial and innovation 
policy. These policies explicitly address the issues of industrial upgrading. 
 
Shifting the focus to industrial and technology (innovation) policy: new opportunities 
and problems 
 
The CEE countries have only recently started to develop restructuring policies for different 
industrial sectors, primarily the ‘old’ industries, like coal or steel in Poland. Massive financing 
is needed for sectoral restructuring; lacking political will to come to grips with the large 
social and regional unemployment problems of troubled sectors, together with limited 
administrative capacities of governments, led to the postponement of industrial policy 
measures for troubled industries. This may be understandable given difficult choices that 
governments have to tackle. Should restructuring of troubled sectors be postponed until 
growth becomes stronger and room be given to winning sectors? Even where there is a will 
for restructuring is there a state capacity to undertake it? The quality of financial 
intermediation is critical to the success of restructuring projects. Yet, domestic financial 
systems are ‘shallow’ or unable to take their role in this process. 
Recorded economic growth so far has come from new, small enterprises (Poland, 
Slovenia) or those sectors where foreign enterprises were willing to act as restructuring 
agents (Hungary, Czech Republic). These sectors did not grow due to government industrial 
policy but because of business opportunities exploited by foreign investors and domestic 
entrepreneurs. Instead of siphoning huge funds into few troubled cases, would it not be 
better to support new small firms through pro-active innovation policy rather than focus on 
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socially oriented industrial policies? Being for quite some time caught into the framework of 
transition policies governments only recently came to realize that restructuring at the firm 
level will not take place automatically in response to macroeconomic policy changes or rapid 
shifts in global conditions (Lieberman, 1991). They are searching for a new role, which 
would go beyond normative reductionism of transition policies but would avoid large 
government failures and take into account the quality of state governance24.  
 Within the common trend of withdrawal of state from their role in industry 
restructuring, we find a variety of responses, which can be explained only by taking into 
account the specific national context. For illustration, we show a variety of responses in 
relation to industrial R&D in CEE.    
The diversity of different national responses in industry R&D in CEE can be classified by 
distinguishing between two components: 
 
(i) Whether countries have pursued sudden or gradual changes in the rules of public 
funding of S&T. For example, in the Czech Republic, the government rejected any 
active policy in restructuring R&D institutes and abruptly withdrew financial support to 
the majority of industrial institutes. Since 1991, industrial companies in the Czech 
Republic have had to finance their R&D activities themselves. Industrial institutes 
suddenly lost a relatively secure income and had to find means for survival. Also, in 
privatisation R&D institutes were treated as 'normal' production enterprises. This 
'shock therapy' led a to massive conversion of their activities to services and 
production. 
(ii) Whether countries have pursued active organisational restructuring in the R&D 
system or whether they have left the organisational structures intact. In its strongest 
form, active restructuring was pursued in eastern Germany where individual institutes 
were evaluated and than either closed, split, reorganised, or merged. In the case of 
passive adjustment the organisational structures remain intact. Gradual changes are 
only in terms of financing through gradual introduction of competition principles. 
 
Using these two criteria, the degree of shock or gradualism in public funding and the 
existence, or lack of an active micro restructuring policy, we can distinguish four different 
national situations (see more about this in Dyker and Radosevic, 2000)25.  
Figure 1: Different national patterns of R&D restructuring 
 
 
'Radical active restructuring’ (I) 
Example: eastern Germany 
 
 
'Gradual active restructuring' (II) 
Example: Poland 
 
'Radical passive adjustment' (III) 
Example: Czech Republic 
 
 
'Gradual passive adjustment' (IV) 
Examples: Russia, Bulgaria, Romania 
 
                                                 
24 We illustrated earlier that even when governments tried to operate as ‘watchman’ that has produced 
stalemate.  
25 Hungary and Slovakia do not fall clearly in this matrix as they have followed inconsistent policies which 
may be described as ‘Combined radical and gradual passive adjustments’ (see Dyker and Radosevic, 2000). 
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In this matrix Russian S&T policy falls in the box ‘Gradual passive adjustment’. Institutional 
(basic) funding on civil R&D in Russia is still dominant. More than half of basic funding is 
targeted to R&D institutions in the industrial sector, meaning that as before, budget funds 
continue to be a substitute for applied R&D financing by enterprises (Gokhberg and 
Sokolov, 1998). If this was part of active restructuring than it would not be a problem. 
However, there is no sign that this policy is leading to integration of R&D into industrial 
enterprises. 
 
Officially, the Ministry of Science and Technological Policy officially has abandoned the 
policy of 'science salvation' and has initiated prioritisation in funding and differentiation 
among institutes. For example, it has granted sixty institutes the status of 'State Scientific 
Centre'. However, this is still a gradual change which has only prevented full erosion of these 
institutions (see Gaponenko, 1995). 
 
How do we evaluate different national options in restructuring of S&T? Are some better 
than others? The answer is that there is not better or worse policy pattern in isolation. Policy 
options can become a problem when they are inconsistent, i.e. when objectives cannot be 
supported by funding or other mechanisms. Whether a policy should be in the direction of 
active or passive restructuring, or gradual or radical reduction in public funding, depends on 
the capability of policy to achieve its objectives without generating too much cost for the 
S&T system and economy.  
 
Gradualist policy in conditions of limited budgets could be very costly in terms of erosion of 
R&D system and prevention of active restructuring. If budgets and a management capability 
are available to undertake organisational restructuring in an S&T system, as was the case in 
eastern Germany, than radical solutions are the ‘cheapest’. When the decline in financing is 
so marked that an orderly restructuring of R&D institutions is impossible, than gradual 
passive adjustment may be the only option for some time. This was indeed the case in Russia 
in the early years of transition. However, we think that the future persistence in this policy 
has become counterproductive by actually speeding up the erosion of S&T system.  
After 10 years of gradual changes in the principles of funding but without any undertaking of 
an active organisational and functional restructuring, Russian S&T policy should finally 
develop the component of active of restructuring. The continuation of current gradual, 
passive adjustment causes good research groups and teams to be squeezed out by those who 
do not have the chance to prosper in a long-term. 
 
However, as with any strategic change, its complexity is in its implementation, costs and resistance 
to change rather than in its design. The difficulty of active restructuring in Russia is in the need 
to ensure that the restructuring is decentralised and bottom-up driven and yet, that it is co-
ordinated at the same time.  
 
So far, CEECs have been trying to restrict themselves from any explicit and clear 
role in restructuring and industrial upgrading. A withdrawal from any explicit role in industry 
restructuring and in industry upgrading is a common characteristic of the most of the 
CEECs, including Russia. For example, Russian government still retains a controlling stake 
of shares in 30% of all industrial firms, with total output accounting for 20-25% of GD as 
well as the controlling power of a majority shareholder through the so called golden share in 
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large firms and key industries (Kuznetsova and Kuznetsov, 1999). . Yet, in practice, 
representation of state interests is left to the discretion of individual administrators and the 
system operates without any performance targets as far as the state property is concerned. 
This withdrawal of the state to impose any performance requirements hinders restructuring 
of enterprises (ibid.).  
The result of withdrawal of the state in industry upgrading in CEE is its 
unsystematic, implicit and ad hoc involvement through other policies in particular 
privatization and FDI policy. Central European states are now in the process of building 
alternative policies like innovation policy. Poland and Slovenia have been early precursors in 
that respect. There are signs that in other countries, innovation issues are beginning to be 
given a higher place in policy agenda. Hungary has developed a range of programs to 
support technological development in the last few years. In addition, Czech government 
reoriented its priorities since 1998 towards emphasis on industrial R&D, FDI and 
competitiveness26. However, the current situation can be characterized as the one of 
exploration and search for a new role of government, which would go beyond the 
‘watchman’.  
 
 
In search of policy rationale 
 
After 10 years of pursuing the transition policy agenda, CEECs are now searching 
for alternative policy solutions that will also address the problem of their technological 
competitiveness. Given the current role of the state in these countries, it is unlikely that we 
will see the implementation of highly selective structural (industrial and technological) 
policies aimed at a strengthening of inter-firm and inter-sectoral technological linkages. The 
CEECs are in the process of developing public policies, which are ‘market friendly’ and 
correspond to the capacity of individual states to implement them in co-operation with 
enterprises, public, and private organisations. This process is not a rational search but highly 
politicised process, in which ad hoc interventions dominate in most countries. Policy options 
range from sector-specific or vertical policies (industrial policies) to horizontal policies 
(technology policy). Should CEE pursue industrial policies that have immediate effects but 
are also much more demanding in terms of administrative requirements and finance? In view 
of the negative experiences of CEE with state-run policies, there is a natural resistance to 
promote policies with the imminent danger for government failure, whereby policy is easily 
turned into lobbying. An alternative would be to pursue technology (horizontal) policies that 
do not address specific sectors but target deficient capabilities, like R&D, engineering, 
production quality, or deficiencies in technical infrastructure (IT, testing and measurement 
facilities, etc). The drawback of these policies is that they work slowly and with unclear 
sectoral effects. When setting aside limited public funding, governments are seeking tangible 
and much quicker results. To illustrate these policy dilemmas, we will use examples from 
sectoral studies. 
 
The pros and cons of industrial policy 
Technology policy is only one element in the market-finance-technology triangle. Industrial 
restructuring is an activity that tries to assist in recombining the relationship between these 
                                                 
26 ADE, MERIT and SSEES, (2001) ‘Innovation Policy in Six Applicant Countries: the Challenges’ 
Second Interim Report to the EU, DG Enterprise, January.  
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three elements. In different cases problems arise in different elements of the triangle. In 
some cases, finance will automatically solve the problem of technology, which is easily 
available. For example, the major policy issue in Polish shipbuilding is not S&T but 
industrial policy. Once the issues of large orders and finance were resolved, technology was 
not the key constraint. In the government-led restructuring of the former East German 
shipyards, the crucial bottleneck was not in the area of technology but in the huge amounts 
of finance needed for technical modernisation. In telecommunications in CEE, sectoral S&T 
policy turned out to be secondary to industrial policy, which is actually implemented via 
privatisation policy. Solving the issue of control by privatising the national telephone 
company, the Hungarian government simultaneously resolved the problem of technical 
modernisation. In Russia’s in telecom sector, it is privatisation and financing policies, in 
addition to a liberal regulatory environment, that seem to be more important than S&T 
policy. 
 
We pointed to problems of industrial policy that are primarily problems of government 
failure. A case in point would be government support for sectoral restructuring used to 
balance the cash flow. However, an equally serious problem may be the irrelevance of 
industrial policy due to the inter-sectoral nature of new technologies. CEE industrial 
transformation is full of examples of enterprises that have had to change from one industry 
to another when faced with the danger of closure. A Hungarian enterprise that became part 
of Hungary Ericcson initially evolved in the PC sector and is now assembling switching 
equipment and support for its software, while the Hungarian telephone company, which 
came from the transmission side, was now having to learn about the manufacturing of 
switching equipment. Examples like this illustrate that what matters is the knowledge base of 
enterprises and the irrelevance of industry as a policy category. This is not only true in 
sectors whose boundaries are changing, like software and telecoms, but also in sectors that 
are increasingly becoming “bundles of technologies,” like the shipbuilding, food processing, 
or car sectors. 
 
The pros and cons of technology (innovation) policy 
Targeting industry-specific constraints may not solve technological constraints, as 
technologies largely are also generic. Many of the constraints in the diffusion of information 
technologies in CEE are generic or applicable to a large number of sectors. Inventory 
control of optimisation of business processes, quality control systems, problems of 
measuring and testing infrastructure, or the technical level of small firms, are generic, not 
industry-specific, problems. The networks of innovation centres are one of the solutions for 
problems of SMEs. Also, innovation (technology) policy is less prone to government failure 
as its constituency is more dispersed and unable to capture the policy process.  
 
However, we already pointed out that these horizontal types of policies have long-term 
effects. They are pro-active but may not be a priority for CEE governments, which usually 
have to react ex-post to a variety of emergency problems. It may not surprise that many 
technology policy initiatives, like S&T parks, innovation centres, etc, in CEE have been 
supported by foreign funds and through technical assistance. Pressed with immediate 
sectorally specific problems, governments prefer to see the immediate effects of their actions 
rather than build a support system whose final users and benefits cannot be immediately 
identified. 
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The pros and cons of sector-specific (technology) innovation policies 
Implementing sector-specific innovation policies could solve the problem of technology 
policy target groups and their long-term effects. For example, the sectoral study on car 
industry produced within this project clearly suggests that innovation policies should 
concentrate on how to help SMEs working in this sector access and absorb the technology 
needed to be able to respond to demand from car assemblers. Market forces by themselves 
will not be adequate to develop this sector; specific policies will be necessary to support its 
growth. Thus the issue is one of developing specific policies and enlarging and deepening the 
cluster of subcontractors. We believe that a large number of such cases should be addressed 
through sector-specific innovation policy. These policies can target groups of companies and 
identify their key competence gaps, which can then be addressed - in co-operation with 
industrial associations or foreign investors. 
 
However, objections to this type of policy are similar to objection vis-à-vis industrial policy. 
Industries are increasingly incorporating a mix of core technologies. For example, four major 
technological streams influence food processing at present: mechanical equipment in the 
production process; food chemistry in production technology; biotechnology in product 
innovations; and technologies in raw materials and packaging. How would or could industry-
specific innovation policies work in this case?  
 
In conclusion, when we delve into the specificity of industry dynamics in CEE and try to go 
beyond economists’ generalisations and abstractions for and against government 
intervention, we find that there is no conclusive answer regarding appropriate policy. The 
problem is not the type of policy per se but the capability of government to implement it in 
cooperation with industry. In other words, the empirical evidence produced within this 
project shows a variety of possible policy approaches, none of which should be dismissed as 
a priori more appropriate than another. Their (in)appropriateness is possible only within the 
specific industry and country context and includes an assessment of the role of the state and 
business-government interactions. 
 
One could imagine a situation where all three approaches are possible in one country 
depending on sector- and country-specific constraints and opportunities. From a normative 
point of view, any option seems viable as long as it is effective and leads to industrial 
upgrading. 
 
 
How to support industrial upgrading in globalised economy? 
 
We already pointed to the difficulties of building new role of the state in a globalised 
economy where state has to learn to cooperate with MNCs in order to improve the 
competitiveness of its industry. Most CEE economies have fully liberalized FDI inflows and 
guaranteed the free repatriation of both profits and FDI capital. EBRD (1998, p. 89) shows 
that capital flows have been liberalized gradually, with the most liberalized flows being in 
countries tha t are at an advanced stage of transition. Through privatization states also tried 
to maximize benefits of their open door, policy by negotiating better terms with individual 
foreign strategic investors. However, these have been unsystematic attempts to tra de 
ownership of domestic ‘blue-chip’ companies for long-term benefits in technology and 
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employment. CEE governments have not yet learned to deal with foreign investors in a 
more systematic way and integrate them into domestic industry strategy. A current policy is 
to welcome whoever comes and to offer as much as possible a generous set of incentives. 
An experience of east Asian economies and recent experience of ‘Celtic tiger’ Ireland shows 
that this may not suffice. Similar to east Asia the experience of Ireland (see O’Connor, 20001 
for a review) shows that the selectivity in FDI policy and enhancing complementarities with 
indigenous industry are essential in order to exploit benefits of globalised environment. A 
need for strategic FDI policy has come clearly from the previous experiences. The 
complexity of factors needed for ‘growth miracles’ is far too complex to be emulated in any 
other country. However, some ingredients from successful cases will have to be learned and 
implemented. In a new globalised environment selective targeting of individual foreign 
investors and joint work with them towards industrial upgrading is one of them. An 
emerging new agenda for CEE governments is to foster a match between developments in 
the domestic research and training infrastructure and the specialization profile of foreign 
investors. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
 
1. There is an increasing differentiation among CEECs in growth and institutional change: 
catching-up and falling behind: structural improvements but also structural deterioration. 
The cases of fast growth and also of further falling behind correspond to structural 
improvements and to structural deterioration. The question what explains the increasing 
differentiation among east European economies in terms of growth and institutional 
change is not resolved among economists. Our explanation has highlighted the 
importance of structural factors in explaining these differences, and in particular factors 
that determine technology accumulation and learning processes. 
2. If judged solely by initial endowments, the CEECs have the opportunity to grow faster 
than the world leaders. Based on their GDP, R&D and investment levels they belong to 
‘catching-up’ economies (Verspagen, 1999).  The science and technology base of the 
CEE countries was relatively large during the socialist period. The educational level of 
the population and the skills of labour force are also relatively developed.  These initial 
endowments indicate a growth potential but they are far from sufficient for high growth. 
A social capability to make use of factor endowments and to align domestic with the 
interests of a foreign capital is decisive for catching-up. The lack of social capability is 
most striking in the case of Russia where the gap between export and human capital 
structures is striking.  
3.  We traced the current problems in industry and technological upgrading in CEE to 
differences in the socialist period, in particular to factors at the micro-level. The three 
main micro-aspects of transformation of national industrial systems in CEE are: the way 
enterprises develop their business functions; the way business functions between 
enterprises and related infrastructure are redistributed; the ways in which insertion into 
world markets and production networks of Eastern European enterprises and sectors 
takes place. The development of business functions is essential for the reconstitution of 
enterprises and growth of their organizational capabilities. It has been assumed that 
privatization and then good corporate governance will stimulate firm restructuring. The 
evidence shows that privatization has been automatically followed by restructuring. 
Ownership is an endogenous variable in restructuring and growth of enterprises. The 
extent and depth of restructuring reflects ownership but also the available resources and 
institutional constraints of the environment in which they operate. The most 
restructuring has been passive or reactive. Foreign firms and de novo private firms, 
which are spared of ownership problems but also of problems with outdated product 
mix, surplus of employment, old organisational routines, etc. have been much more 
active in terms of scope and scale of restructuring activities.  
4. Industrial upgrading requires changes at the firm as well as at inter-firm and sectoral 
levels. A lack of organisational capabilities in this respect was especially detrimental to 
this process. A lack of product system integration capabilities and a lack of network 
building capabilities at firm level which were endemic to in the past continue to hinder 
restructuring in CEE. This has been further aggravated by the phenomenon of 
disorganization, which has become a strong feature of transition in the CIS. All this led 
to a situation that we described as ‘truncated integration’ into world economy. By this we 
mean that enterprises wit undeveloped all business functions are integrated by 
surrendering control over critical functions (R&D, finance, marketing) to foreign 
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partners. This has led to large efficiency improvements in production, especially in 
foreign controlled firms, but also to limited strategic autonomy of domestic enterprises 
and affiliates. 
5. Industry and technology upgrading of CEE is based on significantly, and in some sectors 
fundamentally, changed innovation process and knowledge base. A locus of technology 
efforts has moved from extra-mural R&D activities to firm-specific operations oriented 
around cost-efficiency and quality management activities. These are areas where the 
socialist enterprises were the weakest in the past. However, we also pointed out industry 
upgrading is non-linear process with thresholds in learning and structural barriers in 
terms of composition of requited skills and factors. The best way to overcome them is to 
build firm-specific skills as well as broad and diversified knowledge base through 
innovation infrastructure that closely cooperates with industry. The successes of the last 
10 years brought new structural barriers. A continued marginalization of R&D system 
may become obstacle for further industry upgrading. A general level of education of 
labour force does not seem to be an obstacle for productivity improvements at shop-
floor level. However, a high share of population with vocational education is an obstacle 
for economy wide restructuring, in particular concerning adoption of IT technologies, 
not so much their use.  Training and re-training programs, designed in cooperation with 
industry, should be given priority.  
6. CEE has been reintegrated into the world economy at a time when trade patterns are 
strongly shaped by complex integration strategies of MNCs and by changes in 
international trade and FDI regimes. CEECs, especially central European, have fully 
conformed to the new regime of global political economy and continue to adjust to the 
requirements of the EU accession. The scale of their restructuring challenges and the 
reduced scope for autonomous action in this respect made them extremely dependent on 
foreign markets, capital and organisational capabilities. Even Russia cannot expect any 
fast restructuring of sectors like oil, gas, cars or telecoms, without deep involvement of 
foreign capital and management. Central European economies have been very active in 
trying to lure foreign investors. Much of FDI has entered to access local markets, to 
export to EU and to takeover assets in sectors like telecoms, and energy. The degree and 
pace of penetration of FDI in CEE has been fast and deep and is now comparable to the 
East Asian economies. The direct effects of FDI have been very positive as indicated by 
productivity data, especially when compared to domestic controlled firms. This has 
created concerns about the emergence of dual economy, similar to other economies 
whose growth is reliant on FDI.  Experience from other countries shows that furthering 
of positive effects of FDI (indirect effects) does not come automatically. The degree to 
which FDI will benefit CEECs will to a great extent depend on their absorptive and 
innovative capabilities. Fortunately, the changes in the way MNCs increasingly operate 
create more opportunities for CEECs to use FDI to their advantage than it has been 
generally case in the past. There is evidence that MNCs are not longer closed hierarchies 
where headquarters are responsible for all critical functions. Local affiliates have much 
more opportunities for upgrading their position within companies’ networks. Innovation 
can be now generated at different locations within MNC network. A limited research on 
non-equity or external-MNCs links are currently more important for production 
integration of CEE than FDI. In particular, subcontracting arrangements play an 
important role in quality management and in learning process-engineering skills. There is 
strong need for further research on subcontracting networks in CEE.  It is only recently 
that the policy in central Europe has recognised subcontracting as an important channel 
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of production integration by establishing departments for supporting subcontracting 
activities.  
7.  A review of several industry studies has generated six stylized facts on industry 
restructuring in CEE. First, there has been a significant vertical disintegration of old 
production links and re-establishment of new links, especially with foreign suppliers and 
buyers. These are: vertical links, organized the most often through subcontracting links, 
and, horizontal links, organized most often through FDI. Second, CEE companies have 
integrated into production networks primarily as subcontractors or processors. Their 
inherent weakness is marketing and finance and the lack of brands as well as high 
barriers to enter into non-production parts of value chains prevented them from to 
integrate as autonomous producers with the complete set of value chain activities. 
However, the dependence on foreign organizers of value chains enabled them to quickly 
catch-up in terms of productivity, especially when they are parts of intra-MNCs 
networks. Third, a radical change in production chains and in the innovation process 
made much of imitative skills from the past obsolete or irrelevant in a new context. 
However, the transferable skills have often been successfully re-employed in a new 
context. Fourth, in situations when old transferable or sector-specific technology skills 
are favorable and when domestic market and finance are available there is a great 
probability that domestic-led modernization will take place. Examples are PC assembly, 
software, and parts of food industry. In sectors where technology gap and financial 
requirements are large we may observe technology modernisation that is led by foreign 
investors. Examples are telecommunication and car assembly. Fifth, whether technical 
modernisation will take place does not depend on structural variables – market, finance 
and technology – but is dependent on a variety of other factors like mode of 
privatization, political commitment and entrepreneurship. Examples of Polish and 
Russian shipbuilding industries illustrate well different outcomes with structurally similar 
factors. Sixth, high productivity improvements and catching-up, through increased unit 
prices and reduced quality gaps, is bringing some of advanced countries and sectors to 
new structural barriers for further growth. Further industry upgrading in several sectors, 
like car parts, will require more diversified subcontracting networks, close cooperation 
between large and small firms, and support to public/private R&D activities. 
8. Factor availability is only a conditional advantage, which requires a network organizer to 
be turned into real advantage. A network organizer is an agent who is willing and able to 
restructure production networks. Limited and unsystematic evidence shows that there is 
a diversity of network organisers in CEE. For the time being, the most active network 
organisers are foreign MNCs. They have significantly improved productivity levels of 
firms that have been taken over and through competition in sectors like food industry 
have induced domestic firms to restructure. Our understanding of their role as 
organizers of supply chains is still limited. A specific institutional environment of CEE 
has produced diversified business groups as an organizational response of domestic 
capital. There are individual examples that these groups have started to operate as 
network organizers. Few examples, especially of Moldavian Agency for Restructuring 
and Enterprise Assistance (ARIA) which operate as a true restructuring agent are 
extremely valuable as they show the range of policy options. 
9.  The more successful economies have a co-ordinated structure of 'local governance' that 
appears to be giving them the ability to reproduce themselves as successful economies. 
The CEECs left socialism with very weak layer of regional institutions and competencies 
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for independent decision making. This is the result of lowers level of development where 
networks are usually fragmented and separated. In addition, socialist heritage has further 
weakened region as a locus of innovation. Proximity was not an asset in socialism. In 
CEE, regions lack horizontal links; a share of monostructural regions is high. Most often 
current actions to support innovation at regional level suffered from top-down approach 
and emphasized organizations, not functions. The impression is that no coherent 
regional policy agenda has been set in CEE as transition related issues had absolute 
priority. 
10. Under the influence of transition agenda the CEE states to varying degrees tried to 
disengage from industry upgrading or any active role in industry restructuring. After 10 
years there are indications that the CEE states are searching for a new role which would 
reconcile requirements of a new global regime of trade and investment openness with 
the need to support industry modernization. Transition pollicies have been successful in 
systemic transformation but their effects on technical modernization have been 
ambiguous. The experience has shown that there is a clear need for integration of 
transition and structural policies. The issue is to develop policy mixes, which would be 
suitable for individual countries.  The further countries are in transition they should 
search for mixes, which address issues of innovation and structural change. We argue 
that countries should experiment with a variety of approaches, none of which should be 
dismissed as more appropriate than others. The key criteria for the effective policy 
should be the quality of state governance, not the degree of selectivity. All CEE states 
have realized that industry upgrading can be efficiently done only in cooperation with 
foreign capital. However, their capabilities, in particular the quality of state governance, 
to engage foreign capital into this process varies greatly. They vary from ‘open door 
policy’ to attempts to control involvement of foreign capital through implicit 
(privatization) and explicit (FDI) policies.   
11. For the time being it seems that there are three emerging models of production 
integration at micro level in CEE which have visible effects on the tiering of countries in 
terms of growth and types of development: 
-  cross national production network driven industrial restructuring (central Europe); 
-  maquilladora type of restructuring through subcontracting links (Romania and 
Bulgaria and other Balkan states); 
-  autonomous development strategy (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). 
These types of networks are the result of the role, which the emerging global 
networks play in individual countries as well as of the nationally specific patterns of 
transition and growth.  An additional factor in these outcomes is the EU accession policy 
whose impact will become much stronger as the enlargement progresses. Its effect may be 
further polarization of modes of involvement of foreign capital in these three groups. 
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